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1CAUSATION AND ATTENUATION  
IN THE SLAVERY REPARATIONS DEBATE   
Kaimipono David Wenger*
The success or failure of slavery reparations will depend on 
causation.  Many criticisms of reparations have focused on the 
attenuated nature of the harm, suggesting that modern claimants are 
not connected to slaves, that modern payers are not connected to slave 
owners, and that harms suffered by modern Blacks cannot be 
connected to slavery.  This Article examines these attenuation 
concerns and finds that they come in three related but distinct 
varieties:  Victim attenuation, wrongdoer attenuation, and act 
attenuation.  These three components, defined in this Article, show 
themselves in a number of interrelated legal and moral arguments.  
The Article then discusses how ideas about causation from the 
mass tort context can help address the problems of attenuation in 
slavery reparations.  Mass tort cases have developed novel methods of 
showing causation, such as statistical evidence and market share 
liability, and these tools can be used in the reparations context.  These 
concepts, if used within the reparations context, could help overcome 
attenuation.   
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The case for slavery reparations is failing.  Scholars continue to 
write about reparations,1 but they seem increasingly to be the only 
ones on the bandwagon.  The media is sometimes ambivalent and 
occasionally hostile.2 The lukewarm media reception mirrors societal 
feelings in general.3 Proposed legislation has failed to advance in 
 
1 See generally Kaimipono David Wenger, Slavery as a Takings Clause 
Violation, 53 Am. U. L. Rev. 191, 193 nn. 4-5 (collecting legal scholarship 
addressing reparations); Alfred L. Brophy, Reparations Talk: Reparations for Slavery 
and the Tort Law Analogy, 24 B.C. Third World L.J. 81, 82-84 (2003) (noting 
advances in reparations discussion); Alfred Brophy, Some Conceptual and Legal 
Problems in Reparations for Slavery, 58 NYU Ann. Surv. Am. L. 497, 505 (2002) 
(discussing development of reparations theory) [hereinafter Brophy, Some 
Problems]. 
 Some of the major reparations pieces in recent years include Randall 
Robinson, The Debt: What America Owes to Blacks (1999); Should America Pay?: 
Slavery and the Raging Debate on Reparations (Raymond A. Winbush ed., 2003) 
[hereinafter Should America Pay?]; Mari J. Matsuda, Looking to the Bottom: Critical 
Legal Studies and Reparations, 22 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 323 (1987); and 
reparations symposia at New York University, see Symposium, A Dream Deferred: 
Comparative and Practical Considerations for the Black Reparations Movement, 58 
N.Y.U. Ann. Surv. Am. L. 447 (2002), the University of Memphis, see Symposium, 
33 U. Mem. L. Rev. 245 (2003), Boston College, see Symposium, 24 B.C. Third 
World L.J. 1 (2004), Boston University, see Symposium, The Jurisprudence of 
Slavery Reparations, 84 B.U. L. Rev. 1135 (2004), Harvard, see Symposium, 20 
Harv. BlackLetter L.J. 17, and Boalt Hall, see Symposium, 6 Afr.-Am. L. & Pol’y 
Rep. 1 (2004).  Modern legal reparations literature is generally acknowledged to 
have begun with professor Boris Bittker’s work.  See Boris Bittker, The Case for 
Black Reparations (Beacon Press 2003) (1973). 
2 See, e.g., Kevin Merida, Did Freedom Alone Pay a Nation’s Debt?; Rep. John 
Conyers Jr. Has a Question, He’s Willing to Wait a Long Time for the Right 
Answer, Wash. Post, Nov. 23, 1999, at C-01; see also Vincene Verdun, If the Shoe 
Fits, Wear It:  An Analysis of Reparations to African Americans, 67 Tul. L. Rev. 
597, 607 n.29 (collecting media accounts); Wenger, supra note 1, at 195 nn. 6-7 
(same). 
3 Polls show that overwhelming majorities of whites oppose reparations, while 
Blacks support reparations.  See Michael Kranish, Blacks Rally on Capital for 
Slavery Reparations: Farrakhan Seeks Transfer of Land, Boston Globe, Aug. 18 
2002, at A3 (discussing these findings from the CNN/USA Today/Gallup Poll); 
Alfred Brophy, The Cultural War Over Reparations for Slavery, 53 DePaul L. Rev. 
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Congress.4 Recently, in a closely watched consolidated case, a federal 
court dismissed reparations claims, a development that could signal the 
death knell of all slavery reparations litigation.5
Why is the theory of reparations so divorced from the reality?  It 
seems that a disjunct exists between scholarly writing on reparations 
and real world decisions.6 One source of this disjunct is the difficult 
nature of establishing causation in reparations cases.  This Article will 
address the unique problems of causation and attenuation that arise in 
the reparations context. 
 
1181, 1182-85 (discussing statistics) [hereinafter Brophy, Cultural War]; see also 
Lee A. Harris, “Reparations” as a Dirty Word:  The Norm Against Slavery 
Reparations, 33 U. Mem. L. Rev. 409, 410 n.9 (discussing these and other poll 
results).  See generally Taunya Lovell Banks, Exploring White Resistance to Racial 
Reconciliation in the United States, 55 Rutgers L. Rev. 903, 915-19 (2003) 
(discussing demographics of Americans opposed to reparations). 
4 Representative John Conyers (D. Mich.) first introduced a bill in 1989 that 
would have established a commission to study the effects of slavery and recommend 
appropriate remedies. The bill died in committee, and has been reintroduced (and 
repeatedly killed) every Congress since then. See H.R. 3745, 101st Cong. (1989); 
H.R. 1684, 102d Cong. (1991); H.R. 40, 103d Cong. (1993); H.R. 891, 104th Cong. 
(1995); H.R. 40, 105th Cong. (1997); H.R. 40, 106th Cong. (1999); H.R. 40, 107th 
Cong. (2001); H.R. 40, 108th Cong. (2003). Representative Conyers has stated, “I 
have re-introduced H.R. 40 every Congress since 1989, and will continue to do so 
until it’s passed into law.” John Conyers, Jr., Major Issues—Reparations: The 
Commission to Study Reparations Proposals for African Americans Act, at 
http://www.house.gov/conyers/news_ reparations.htm. See also Verdun, supra note 
2, at 606-07 & n. 28 (discussing proposed legislation); Wenger, supra note 1, at 194 
n.6 (same). 
5 In re African-American Slaves Descendants Litigation, 375 F. Supp. 2d 721 
(N.D. Ill. 2005).  The Slave Descendants case was particularly important because it 
was the first major reparations case in federal court in ten years.  Previously, in the 
only opinion by an appellate court dealing with reparations, claims against the 
government were dismissed.  See Cato v. United States, 70 F.3d 1103 (9th Cir. 
1995).  Slave Descendants took a different tack, seeking compensation from private 
rather than governmental actors.  Both Cato and Slave Descendants are discussed in 
more detail  infra.
6 Cf. Brophy, Reparations Talk, supra note 1, at 83-86. 
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Causation is a familiar concept to legal scholars.  Tort liability 
requires a showing of proximate causation.7 Claimants must show not 
only conceptual “but-for” causation — that “but for” a party’s actions, 
the harm would not have occurred — but must also establish legally 
actionable “proximate cause.”8 In reparations cases, the attenuated 
nature of the harm makes it difficult to show proximate cause.9
7 See, e.g., Guido Calabresi, Concerning Cause and the Law of Torts: An Essay 
for Harry Kalven, Jr., 43 U. Chi. L. Rev. 69, 69-72 (1975); Richard W. Wright, 
Causation in Tort Law, 73 Cal. L. Rev. 1735, 1737-39 (1985). 
8 See Elizabeth C. Price, Toward A Unified Theory of Products Liability: 
Reviving the Causative Concept of Legal Fault, 61 Tenn. L. Rev. 1277, 1347 (1994) 
(“‘Cause-in-fact,’ ‘factual cause,’ or ‘but for’ causation, as every first-year law 
student knows, is generally an indispensable requisite to recovery in tort. It is the 
first head of the two-headed hydra of causation. The other head . . .is ‘proximate’ or 
‘legal’ cause, a policy tool designed to cut off liability for acts perceived as too 
remote, attenuated, or mere conditions.”); Kim Forde-Mazrui, Taking Conservatives 
Seriously: A Moral Justification for Affirmative Action and Reparations, 92 Cal. L. 
Rev. 683, 727 (2003) (“Actual causation is but a starting point for establishing 
responsibility, making the causal agent ‘eligible’ for responsibility.”). W. Page 
Keeton et al., Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts 264 (1984) (“As a practical 
matter, legal responsibility must be limited to those causes which are so closely 
connected with the result and of such significance that the law is justified in 
imposing liability.”).  Thus, the law generally treats as actionable those 
“consequences which follow in unbroken sequence, without an intervening efficient 
cause, from the original negligent act.”  See 57A Am. Jur. 2d Negligence § 491.  
“For such consequences the original wrongdoer is responsible, even though he or she 
could not have foreseen the particular results which did follow or results of a similar 
nature.”  Id. See also Keeton et al., supra, at 301-08 (discussing intervening causes); 
Oscar S. Gray, The Law of Torts 86-87 (1986) (discussing proximate cause).   
9 In the words of one critic, reparations advocates point to an injury which is 
not “fairly traceable to slavery through a chain that contains no links of independent 
causation.”  Calvin Massey, Some Thoughts on the Law and Politics of Reparations 
for Slavery, 24 B.C. Third World L.J. 157, 166 (2004); see also id. (“I am 
contending only that the nexus between slavery and the present forces that produce 
the sense of injustice felt by black Americans today is too attenuated to merit a 
judicial award of damages based on restitution.”); see infra § I.B. (discussing 
attenuation in reparations literature).  For other examples of the attenuation 
discussion in reparations literature, see, e.g., Eric J. Miller, Reconceiving 
Reparations:  Multiple Strategies in the Reparations Debate, 24 B.C. Third World 
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Attenuation is diminished or failed causation.10 Attenuation is 
typically created by a conceptual separation between two actors or 
events, or a dilution or weakening of the conceptual connection 
between the two.  As such, attenuation severs theoretical “but-for” 
causation from legally actionable proximate cause.   
In this Article, I turn an analytical eye to attenuation arguments 
used in the reparations debate, defining and examining different types 
of attenuation arguments that arise in the literature.  Attenuation 
arguments as used in the reparations debate come in three types, which 
I identify and classify for the first time: victim attenuation, wrongdoer 
attenuation, and act attenuation.  Victim attenuation is found in the 
argument that modern Blacks11 have no direct connection to slaves; 
wrongdoer attenuation, that modern Americans tend to lack specific 
individual connections to slave holders; and act attenuation, that 
 
L.J. 45, 52 (2003) (noting the problem of attenuation); Art Alcausin Hall, There is a 
Lot to be Repaired Before We Get to Reparations: A Critique of the Underlying 
Issues of Race That Impact the Fate of African American Reparations, 2 Scholar 1, 
27-32 (2003) (noting recurrence of the attenuation defense); Eric Posner & Adrian 
Vermeule, Reparations for Slavery and Other Historical Injustices, 103 Colum. L. 
Rev. 689, 708 (2003) (noting difficulty in connecting past wrongs to present harm); 
James R. Hackney Jr., Ideological Conflict, African American Reparations, Tort 
Causation and the Case for Social Welfare Transformation, 84 B.U. L. Rev. 1193 
(2004) (noting causation problems in reparations context).   
10 “The longer the interval between the protected activity and the adverse 
employment action, the more attenuated becomes the evidence of the requisite 
causation.”  Spadola v. New York City Transit Authority, 242 F. Supp. 2d 284, 294  
(S.D.N.Y. 2003); see generally 57A Am. Jur. 2d Negligence §§ 465, 491 (1989 & 
Supp. 2000) (discussing how temporal factor and an intervening circumstance affect 
remoteness and causation analysis). 
11 Throughout this Article I will use the term “Black” rather than “black” or 
“African-American.”  Cf. Kimberle W. Crenshaw, Race, Reform, and Retrenchment: 
Transformation and Legitimation in Antidiscrimination Law, 101 Harv. L. Rev. 
1331, 1332 n.2 (1988) (“I shall use ‘‘African-American’ and ‘Black’ 
interchangeably.  When using ‘Black,’ I shall use an upper-case ‘B’ to reflect my 
view that Blacks, like Asians, Latinos, and other ‘minorities,’ constitute a specific 
cultural group and, as such, require denotation as a proper noun.”). 
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modern injury to Blacks is unrelated to the harms of slavery.12 After 
defining terms and examining how attenuation arguments are used in 
the slave reparations context, I then discuss concepts from mass torts 
jurisprudence that could apply to the reparations debate.13 
In the end, I seek to set out a framework for analyzing attenuation, 
and to work through some of the major legal attenuation problems.  
This Article will not address all possible attenuation concerns, but will 
 
12 See infra Part I.A. (discussing victim, wrongdoer, and act attenuation). 
13 Causation and attenuation concerns have thus far received little sustained 
treatment in the reparations literature.  A number of scholars have discussed concepts 
of causation briefly.  See, e.g., Brophy, Some Problems, supra note 1, at 519; Posner 
& Vermeule, supra note 9, at 739; Matsuda, supra note 1, at 735.  However, the only 
direct analysis of causation from the tort standpoint has been James Hackney’s short 
essay, Ideological Conflict, African American Reparations, Tort Causation and the 
Case for Social Welfare Transformation.  See Hackney, supra note 9.   
Hackney’s analysis is similar in some ways to the analysis in this Article, and 
provides a useful jumping off point.  Hackney suggests different types of causal 
problems, which are similar to the types of attenuation analyzed in this Article.  
However, this Article differs from Hackney’s essay in many respects.  This Article’s 
classificatory scheme identifies the problems as stemming from attenuation, and 
classifies them in a way that aids the analysis.  This Article also discusses how tort 
law has dealt with these types of attenuation, and sets out a series of suggested 
applications that are beyond the treatment in Hackney’s essay. 
This Article is also limited in its own scope.  This article will primarily address 
attenuation in reparation cases brought for the harm of slavery.  Other reparations 
cases, such as lawsuits brought for the Tulsa riots, present different questions of 
causation and will not be discussed in any depth herein.  See Keith N. Hylton, A 
Framework for Reparations Claims, 24 B.C. Third World L.J. 31, 43 (2004) 
[hereinafter Hylton, Framework] (“When thinking about reparations claims, one 
should avoid the mistake of viewing them as monolithic, having the same difficulties 
in terms of identification of plaintiffs, causation, and prescription of legal rights. In 
fact, reparations claims vary along many legal dimensions, creating a rich array in 
terms of their consistency with settled law.”); see generally Alfred L. Brophy, 
Reconstructing the Dreamland: The Tulsa Riot of 1921 (2002) (giving background of 
Tulsa riots).  I will focus on individual reparations claims, rather than on claims that 
might be brought by African nations seeking compensation for loss of citizens.  
Finally, I will focus on claims derived from the harm of slavery itself, rather than 
claims based on post-emancipation acts such as racism or segregation. 
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address some major legal concerns, and will also set out a framework 
for analyzing concerns. 
 
I. Background 
A. Types of Reparations Claims 
Claims for slavery reparations encompass a number different of 
legal theories, but the two major strands are tort and unjust 
enrichment.14 The most straightforward type of claims are tort claims.
Slaves suffered many deprivations that could potentially trigger tort 
liability.15 They routinely suffered harms including physical injury, 
loss of property, lost wages, loss of liberty, loss of family relations, 
loss of consortium, and mental anguish.16 Their descendants suffer 
today from residual racism, a consequence of slavery.17 
14 This is generally recognized in the literature.  See, e.g., Brophy, Some 
Problems, supra note 1, at 516 (“As to substantive basis, the most commonly cited 
bases are unjust enrichment and tort.”). 
Other theories are possibilities.  Some commenters have suggested bringing 
human rights claims. For example, in provocative language the evokes the possibility 
of a human rights claim, Randall Robinson suggests that slavery was “[a] massive 
crime against humanity . . . an American holocaust.”  Robinson, supra note 1, at 33.  
And in another paper, I have argued that slave descendants could seek recompense 
under the takings clause for taken self-ownership. Wenger, supra note 1.  Despite 
these and other intimations, the two dominant approaches in reparations thus far are 
tort and unjust enrichment. 
15 “Against the proper defendants, the idea of some kind of legal action 
designed to punish and secure compensation seems not only sensible, but 
compelling.” Anthony J. Sebok, Two Concepts of Injustice in Restitution for 
Slavery, 84 B.U. L. Rev. 1405, 1417 (2004) [hereinafter Sebok, Two Concepts]. 
16 See Keith N. Hylton, Slavery and Tort Law, 84. B.U. L. Rev. 1209, 1213-37; 
[hereinafter Hylton, Slavery] (discussing types of harms arising from slavery); 
Sebok, Two Concepts, supra note 15, at 1417; see also Kevin Hopkins, Forgive U.S. 
Our Debts?, Righting the Wrongs of Slavery, 89 Geo. L.J. 2531, 2534 (2001) (“The 
wrongs done to African slaves during slavery, such as the physical capture and 
exploitation of Africans for labor, the inhumane treatment and abuse of slaves by 
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There are also some important conceptual obstacles to any tort 
claim arising from slavery.  For one thing, it is unclear whether slave 
owners owed a legal duty to slaves.  It is also unclear whether they 
owed any duty to slave descendants.18 However, a colorable argument 
can be made that either slave owners indeed owed a duty to slaves or 
their descendants, or that they should have been aware that the regime 
of slavery was legally dubious in a way that they should not be 
surprised to be held to have owed a duty to slaves or their 
descendants.19 For purposes of this Article, in order to focus on 
causation issues, we will assume that slave owners either owed a duty 
either to slaves or to their descendants, and that tort compensability of 
slavery is not negated by its legality at the time.20 
In addition to tort theories, reparations claims have been brought 
under unjust enrichment theories.  Unjust enrichment claims differ 
from tort claims in significant ways.  While a tort claim is a claim at 
law arising from a breach of duty and a negligent or intentional harm, 
an unjust enrichment claim is a hybrid claim in law and equity, and a it 
requires a claimant to show only that a defendant unjustly obtained 
 
white slaveholders, and the psychological abuses in failing to acknowledge and 
respect African personhood, to name only a few, were horrible and unfathomable.”). 
17 See, e.g., Wenger, supra note 1, at 224-26. 
18 If there was no duty owed to either slaves or to future generations (or to some 
other party harmed under slavery), then there is no tort claim.  See Keeton et al, 
supra note 8, at 301-20 (noting need to establish duty).  In addition, if the duty owed 
to a party is particularly weak, it could be viewed as affecting other aspects of tort 
liability such as causation.  See generally Brophy, Some Problems, supra note 1, at 
516 nn. 84-85 (discussing conceptual problems with tort liability for slavery). 
19 Hylton, Slavery, supra note 16, at 1212 (arguing that slavery was a lawless 
regime, and that “applying today’s law to [slavery] should be viewed as bringing law 
to a regime from which it had been entirely displaced”). 
20 Tort law routinely compensates victims of harm cause by acts which were 
legal when performed, such as use of asbestos or Agent Orange, or provision of 
tobacco or DES.  See also Hylton, Slavery, supra note 16, at 1212 (suggesting that 
the legality of slavery undermines the legitimacy of the legal system of the time). 
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some benefit from the claimant, which benefit should be refunded.21 
The measure of damages is the amount of unjust gain.22 Unjust 
enrichment claims provide certain tactical advantages in mass 
compensation litigation and have been successfully used in Holocaust 
and tobacco cases; they also may create particular tactical 
disadvantages.23 Unjust enrichment claims have been brought in the 
slave reparations context, though academics are divided as to whether 
 
21 “The minimum requirements for a claim of unjust enrichment based on 
quantum meruit are: (1) A benefit conferred upon the defendant by the plaintiff; (2) 
an appreciation or knowledge of the benefit by the defendant; and (3) the acceptance 
or retention by the defendant of the benefit under such circumstances as to make it 
inequitable for the defendant to retain the benefit without payment of its value.”  
Sebok, Two Concepts, supra note 15, at 1427; see also Anthony Sebok, Reparations, 
Unjust Enrichment, and the Importance of Knowing the Difference Between the 
Two, 58 NYU Ann. Surv. Am. L. 651, 654-55 (2003) [hereinafter Sebok, Knowing 
the Difference] (further discussing unjust enrichment); Brophy, Some Problems, 
supra note 1, at 521 (discussing arguments in favor of unjust enrichment reparations 
compensation).   
22 See Anthony Sebok, Prosaic Justice, 2002 Legal Aff. 51, 52 [hereinafter 
Sebok, Prosaic Justice]; Emily Sherwin, Reparations and Unjust Enrichment, 84 
B.U. L. Rev. 1443, 1447-49 (2004). 
23 Unjust enrichment claims are less susceptible to statue of limitations 
defenses.  See Sebok, Knowing the Difference, supra note 21, at 653; see also 
Sebok, Two Concepts, supra note 15, at 1418 (noting that states in the tobacco 
litigation used unjust enrichment claims, since these are less susceptible to 
affirmative defenses).    They may have other tactical advantages.  Sherwin, supra 
note 22, at 1449-51.   
Unjust enrichment was included in the Holocaust cases through a circuitous 
route -- the case was originally a replevin claim, and restitution was later added as an 
additional effective tool.  Sebok, Two Concepts, supra note 15, at 1407.  The 
restitution claims ended up being central in the Holocaust settlement.  See id.; see 
also Sebok, Prosaic Justice, supra note 22, at 52.  Unjust enrichment claims, 
however, are uniquely susceptible to equitable defenses.  Sebok, Knowing the 
Difference, supra note 21, at 655.  In addition, they may be less morally compelling 
than conventional tort claims.  Id. at 657; Sebok, Prosaic Justice, supra note 22, at 
52-53. 
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they are appropriate in this area.24 Some scholars have suggested that 
economic loss should be treated as non-descendible.25 This view is 
contested, with others suggesting that economic loss claims ought to 
be viewed as descendible.26 In any event, they are seen as practically 
important; one commenter has argued that unjust enrichment is “the 
only viable strategy remaining” for reparations advocates.27 
In addition to the divide between tort and unjust enrichment 
approaches, there is also a division in reparations between ancestor-
based theories and descendant-based theories.  That is, it is possible to 
bring a claim focused on the harms done to the initial slaves (ancestor-
based theories).  It is also possible to being claims focused on the 
harms which slave descendants continue to suffer today (descendant-
based theories).  (Of course, any particular litigant may seek to raise 
both ancestor- and descendant-based claims.)   
The two different focal points bring their own advantages and 
disadvantages.  An ancestor-based approach will have no problem in 
showing harm -- it is undisputed that slaves were harmed, and a strong 
case can be made for restitution to them.28 However, since no slaves 
are presently alive, an ancestor-based approach encounters difficulties 
 
24 Compare Sebok, Two Concepts, supra note 15, at 1440-42 (suggesting that 
restitution for deceased persons such as slaves is not conceptually coherent and 
should be avoided), and Sherwin, supra note 22, at 1454-65 (arguing that unjust 
enrichment reparations claims are inappropriate because they rely on resentment and 
retaliation) with Hanoch Dagan, Restitution and Slavery:  On Incomplete 
Commodification, Intergenerational Justice, and Legal Transitions, 84 B.U. L. Rev. 
1139, 1158-63 (arguing that restitution claims are descendible and appropriate in the 
reparations context). 
25 Sebok, Two Concepts, supra note 15, at 1431-41.   
26 Dagan, supra note 24, at 1158-64.  One way to elaborate on Dagan’s theory 
is to suggest that unjust enrichment claims brought for property loss, rather than tort-
like claims, could be viewed as more easily passed from one generation to the next. 
27 Sebok, Prosaic Justice, supra note 22, at 52. 
28 See also Andrew Kull, Restitution in Favor of Former Slaves, 84 B.U. L. 
Rev. 1277 (2004) (discussing cases of restitution to slaves found to have been 
wrongfully enslaved). 
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on remedies:  Should a slave descendant receive remedies for harms 
done to an ancestor?   
A descendant-based approach elides that difficulty but runs into 
the opposite problem.  Descendants will not have a problem 
establishing that they are the proper recipient of a remedy -- if they can 
first establish a harm done to them.  But the descendant-based theory 
suffers from difficult questions in establishing harm -- how are modern 
slave descendants harmed by slavery? 
Ultimately, each theory depends on the resolution of the same 
difficult  questions of causation, such as how slaves can be connected 
to modern claimants.     
 
B. General Principles of Causation 
It is black letter law that a  tort claimant must show causation in 
order to establish liability against a defendant.29 However, the idea of 
causation is often  difficult to apply in particular cases.  Well-known 
conceptual problems may complicate any attempt to assign liability for 
an act to a preceding “cause”30-- while an infinite number of factors 
may be considered “but-for” or “factual” causes of a harm,31 only 
some of those will be considered legally actionable causes, those 
 
29 See Keeton et al., supra note 8, at 263-67. 
30 Every effect has multiple causes.  Wex S. Malone, Ruminations on Cause-in-
Fact, 9 Stan. L. Rev. 60, 62 (1956); see also Wright, supra note 7, at 1737 (noting 
that there are innumerable causes for each injury); id. at 1780-85 (discussing tort 
scholarship about multiple causes); Glen O. Robinson, Multiple Causation in Tort 
Law:  Reflections on the DES Cases, 68 Va. L. Rev. 713, 713-14 (causation is vague 
and manipulable, more than a simple question of fact, and actual cause involves 
policy questions just as proximate cause does). 
31 Hart & Honoré, Causation in the Law 10-11 (1967); Keeton et al., supra note 
8, at 266 (“Many courts have devised a ruled, commonly known as the ‘but-for’ or 
‘sine qua non’ rule, which may be stated as follows:  The defendant’s conduct is a 
cause of the event if the event would not have occurred but for that conduct; 
conversely, the defendant’s conduct is not a cause of the event, if the event would 
have occurred without it.”); Gray, supra note 8, at 90-91 (discussing but-for cause). 
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which the law deems “proximate.”32 The determination of legal 
causation depends in part on whether an initial event is necessary,
sufficient, or both, in the causing a second event.   
In the most simple causative scenario, an initial event is both 
necessary and sufficient to cause a second event.  For example, David 
might run into Louise with his car, causing her leg to be broken.  The 
causative event -- David’s collision with Louise -- is both necessary 
and sufficient to cause Louise’s broken leg. 
When a causative event is either not necessary or not sufficient to 
create a second event, causation becomes more complicated.  If an 
initial event is not necessary, we say that causation is overdetermined.
In the classic example, two negligently set fires merge, and a property 
is destroyed by the joint fire.33 Either fire, on its own, would have 
destroyed the property, and so neither fire, taken individually, was 
necessary to cause the end result.  If Fire A had never been set, Fire B 
would still have led to the result.   
In contrast, if an initial event is not sufficient to bring about a 
second event, we say that causation is underdetermined.34 Thus, in the 
well-known case of Palsgraf v. Long Island Railroad, the initial event 
 
32 Keeton et al., supra note 8, at 263 (“An essential element of the plaintiff’s 
cause of action for negligence, of for that matter for any other tort, is that there be 
some reasonable connection between the act or omission of the defendant and the 
damages that the plaintiff has suffered.  This connection is usually dealt with by the 
courts in terms of what is called ‘proximate cause’ or ‘legal cause.’”); see also Gray, 
supra note 8, at 85-91 (discussing proximate and but-for cause); Calabresi, supra 
note 7, at 72-76 (discussing this difference). 
33 Hart & Honoré, supra note 31, at 10-15. 
34 See Aaron Twerski & Anthony J. Sebok, Liability Without Cause? Further 
Ruminations on Cause-In-Fact as Applied to Handgun Liability, 32 Conn. L. Rev. 
1379, 1380 (2000) (“The problem was one of underdetermination. The reason we 
don’t know if the defendant’s breach of duty caused the injury is because we don’t 
know whether the victim was in a position to benefit from the increase in safety that 
the duty was supposed to guarantee.”); see also Malone, supra note 30, at 65 (stating 
that the process of determining causation is often “basically conjecture”); see 
generally Michael Dummett, Frege: Philosophy of Language (1981) (discussing the 
conceptual idea of underdetermination). 
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(negligent handling a box) led to a chain of future events.  The box 
was dropped (a second necessary condition); the box contained 
fireworks (a third necessary condition) which exploded; the explosion 
toppled a set of scales (a fourth necessary condition), and finally the 
plaintiff was harmed.35 We would say that normally dropping a box is 
not sufficient to cause such a chain of events.  Causation was found to 
be underdetermined in Palsgraf, leading to a finding of no liability.36 
Similarly, if a sailor falls off of a ship and drowns, and the ship did not 
maintain adequate safeguards, it may be impossible to know if the 
safety measures would have saved the sailor.37 The sailor may have 
been swept overboard despite the precautions; the cause of his death is 
underdetermined.38 
Both underdetermined and overdetermined causation are 
commonly found in the mass tort context.  A defendant’s product may 
not be necessary to cause a particular harm, making individual cases 
overdetermined.  Where the harm manifests in a physical disease that 
can have many causes showing conventional causation can be 
difficult.39 As Margaret Berger notes, harms for which plaintiffs seek 
compensation may be “found in others who have not been exposed to 
the substance or product in question.” Thus, “it is impossible to tell 
whether an individual plaintiff’s injury is attributable to the product or 
whether it would have manifested itself anyhow.”40 This difficulty 
 
35 Palsgraf v. Long Island R. Co., 248 N.Y. 339, 340 (1928). 
36 Id. 
37 Malone, supra note 30, at 76. 
38 Malone, supra note 30, at 76; Twerski & Sebok, supra note 34, at 1379-82. 
39 See Margaret A. Berger, Eliminating General Causation: Notes Towards a 
New Theory of Justice and Toxic Torts, 97 Colum. L. Rev. 2117, 2123 (1997) 
(“None of these categories of evidence is capable, however, of proving conclusively 
a cause and effect relationship . . . Evidence of this kind is inherently subject to 
considerable uncertainty and inconclusiveness.”); Steve Gold, Note, Causation in 
Toxic Torts:  Burdens of Proof, Standards of Persuasion, and Statistical Evidence, 96 
Yale L.J. 376, 380 (1986). 
40Id. at 2121-22; see also Gold, supra note 39, at 376 (“Proving the cause of 
injuries that remain latent for years, are associated with diverse risk factors, and 
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results from the number of causes that can contribute to a disease; as 
another commentator notes, “rarely is any particular toxic agent the 
exclusive source of a given disease.  Insidious diseases generally have 
several sources, each of which may be sufficient to bring about the 
condition.”41 Underdetermination is also a concern, since a 
defendant’s product may lead to disease only through interaction with 
other acts or circumstances.42 Finally, mass torts typically involve a 
large number of plaintiffs harmed by a defendant’s product.  Some of 
their cases may involve simple causation, while others may have 
underdetermined or overdetermined causative chains.   
With this brief background in causation, we can now turn to the 
specific case of reparations for slavery. 
 
II. Three Types of Attenuation in Reparations 
In the reparations context, many different types of arguments are 
often raised to challenge the idea of causation.  Such arguments use 
the language of attenuation.  These attenuation arguments can be 
divided up in a way that helps us analyze them.  Some of these 
arguments impact directly on the causation analysis, while others are 
less directly related.   
In this part I examine these attenuation arguments that arise in 
discussions of reparations.  Much of this Part is descriptive, setting out 
various attenuation arguments as they have been used by others.  This 
Part is also classificatory, in that it will place specific statements into 
 
occur at background levels even without any apparent cause, is the central problem 
for toxic tort plaintiffs.”). 
41 David Rosenberg, The Causal Connection in Mass Exposure Cases: A Public 
Law Vision of the Tort System, 97 Harv. L. Rev. 849, 856; see also Jack B. 
Weinstein, Individual Justice in Mass Tort Litigation 148-55 (1995) (discussing this 
problem); Robinson, supra note 30, at 759 (stating that a deterministic causation 
approach that assumes a clean relation between an act and the injury is not useful in 
indeterminate cases which require probabilistic evidence). 
42 See, e.g., Robinson, supra note 30, at 759-60; Rosenberg, supra note 41, at 
850-56; Berger, supra note 39, at 2123-30. 
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one or more categories.  Section A will discuss act attenuation, Section 
B will discuss victim attenuation, and Section C will examine 
wrongdoer attenuation. 
Attenuation arguments in reparations have three major thematic 
strands.  These are victim attenuation, wrongdoer attenuation, and act 
attenuation. These interrelated but distinct components correspond to 
a perceived lack of connection between deceased slaves and present 
claimants (victim attenuation); between slave beneficiaries (slave 
holders and governments) and modern citizens or governments 
(wrongdoer attenuation); and between harmful acts of slavery and any 
present injury.43 
43 Some other writers have noted the presence of some of these general themes 
in reparations.  See Brophy, Some Problems, supra note 1, at 505 (“There are, then, 
several distinct problems between connecting past and present. There are problems 
in connecting the past wrongdoers with their successors (who would be the present 
defendants); problems in connecting past victims with their successors (who would 
be the present plaintiffs); and connections between past wrongs and present 
claims.”); see also id. at 503-04 (“The claims are hard to fit into a traditional 
framework for two reasons. First, the victims are making claims against people who 
are not themselves wrongdoers. Furthermore, that defendant class may not have any 
current benefit from the harm. In that case, there will be a claim asserted against a 
discrete group of innocent people. . . . Often the perpetrators cannot be identified 
with specificity or are no longer alive.”); Alfreda Robinson, Corporate Social 
Responsibility and African American Reparations: Jubilee, 55 Rutgers L. Rev. 309, 
365 (2003) (noting that opponents of reparations focus on specific difficulties 
including “the absence of directly harmed individuals,” “the absence of individual 
perpetrators,” and “the lack of direct causation”); Posner & Vermeule, supra note 9, 
at 698 (“Reparations claims thus involve three relationships: (1) the relationship 
between the original wrongdoer and the original victim; (2) the relationship between 
the original wrongdoer and the possible payer of reparations; and (3) the relationship 
between the original victim and the possible claimant or beneficiary of reparations. 
The claimant must show that each relationship is of the proper type.”); id. at 699 
(“Compensatory justice requires a relationship of identity between the wrongdoer 
and payer and a relationship of identity between the victim and claimant.”); Verdun, 
supra note 2, at 628-30 (“Opponents of reparations to African Americans argue that 
living whites have not injured living African Americans; the wrongs of slavery were 
committed by individuals who have been dead for years.  African Americans to day 
were never slaves, and are not entitled to wages for slave labor performed over one 
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A. Act Attenuation 
The first type of attenuation argument that arises in reparations is a 
standard kind of attenuation which I will here call act attenuation — 
the idea that there is no direct connection between past wrongdoing 
and present harm.  Act attenuation is not unique to reparations, but is a 
common theme in much of tort litigation.  For example, Palsgraf, with 
its unique chain of events leading to the ultimate injury, gives an 
example of act attenuation.44 Act attenuation may be created by 
overdetermined or underdetermined causation.  Act attenuation is an 
attack on the move from conceptual cause to proximate cause.45 
Act attenuation is also a common objection to slavery 
reparations.46 One critic notes that a “problematic consideration is 
 
hundred years ago.”); Hylton, Framework, supra note 13, at 39-40 (discussing 
different types of claims and distinguishing them based on whether injurers and 
victims are identifiable). 
Little of the existing scholarship discusses the significance of these different 
variants of attenuation, or seeks to classify and analyze these divisions, as I do in this 
Article.  The closest analogue is James Hackney’s analysis in his recent essay.  See 
Hackney, supra note 9, at 1195-97 (discussing “identification, boundary, and source” 
causation issues).  However, Hackney’s analysis, which is briefer than the discussion 
and analysis in this Article, differs from my analysis in several respects.  Hackney’s 
essay uses a preliminary discussion of some causation issues to frame an analysis 
that focuses on social welfare discussions.  In contrast, this Article focuses on the 
causation concerns themselves, and how they could be addressed by using 
conceptual tools from the mass torts context.   
44 Palsgraf v. Long Island R. Co., 248 N.Y. 339 (1928). 
45 See generally Keeton et al., supra note 8, at 266. 
46 See, e.g., Bittker, supra note 1, at 9; Brophy, Some Problems, supra note 1, at 
518-19.  Attenuation not a special or uniquely high hurdle to forestall reparations 
claims, though they may be unusually susceptible to this defense.  Posner & 
Vermeule, supra note 9, at 711.  Attenuation is a familiar bugbear for civil rights 
advocates.  See Maria L. Marcus, Learning Together: Justice Marshall’s 
Desegregation Opinions, 61 Fordham L. Rev. 69, 90-95 (1992) (noting Supreme 
Court use of attenuation to rule against desegregation claims). 
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causation, which invokes the question of whether the injury presently 
complained of was a foreseeable product of the defendant’s conduct. . . 
. it is necessary to wrestle with the issue of whether that past conduct 
has caused injury to a contemporary plaintiff.”47 This objection is easy 
to understand.  It can be difficult, after all, to connect the harms of 
slavery to specific disadvantages of Blacks today.  Indeed, it is not 
easy to characterize Blacks as a cohesive economic group at all.  There 
are vast differences in wealth, status, and class among individual 
Blacks.48 Some individuals appear to have integrated smoothly into 
society, while others have not.49 
The difficulty of unraveling potential contributing or ameliorating 
causes leads to act attenuation.  Thus, a “lack of sufficient connection 
between past wrong and present claim” is an argument that Matsuda 
calls one of the “standard doctrinal objections to reparations.”50 
Similarly, media and pundit statements discuss act attenuation.51 A
There is certainly no agreement by reparations advocates that proximate cause 
is not satisfied. Brophy, Some Problems, supra note 1, at 123-25; Forde-Mazrui, 
supra note 8, at 728-33 (arguing that chain of proximate causation has not been 
broken by actions of slave descendants). 
47 Massey, supra note 9, at 162-63. 
48 Matsuda, supra note 1, at 375.  Of course, despite these differences, Blacks 
are overwhelmingly less well-off than whites.  See generally Robert Westley, Many 
Billions Gone, Is it Time to Reconsider the Case for Black Reparations?, 40 B.C. L. 
Rev. 429, 471-72 (1998) (same).   
49 As Mari Matsuda notes, “Not all members of the victim group are similarly 
situated. Some are rich, some poor. Some feel betrayed, others do not. Some are 
easily identifiable as group members, others have weak claims to membership.”  
Matsuda, supra note 1, at 375. 
50 Matsuda, supra note 1, at 373-74.  Matsuda’s other standard objections are 
“factual objections and excuse or justification for illegal acts; difficult identification 
of perpetrator and victim groups; [and] difficulty of calculation of damages.”  Id.; 
see also id. at 374 (“The problem of specific identification of wrongdoers and 
victims is a common objection to reparations.”). 
51 Horowitz writes that reparations is “based on the unfounded claim that all 
African-American descendants of slaves suffer from the economic consequences of 
slavery and discrimination” and that “no evidence-based attempt has been made to 
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number of critics suggest that shortcomings of Blacks, individually or 
as a group, are responsible for any present injury.52 
Act attenuation relates affects the cases not only at trial or motion 
stage, where it affects a showing of tort causation.  Act attenuation 
also has important indirect effects on claimants’ very right to press a 
claim.  Courts only allow claims by those who can show standing -- 
that is, a direct connection between a wrongful act and a claimant’s 
injury.53 Act attenuation is a factor in standing inquiry; as the 
Supreme Court has stated, a relevant question in deciding standing is, 
“Is the line of causation between the illegal conduct and injury too 
attenuated?”54 
Act attenuation is a normal obstacle that arises in many cases, not 
just those involving reparations.  Many claimants bring cases where 
causation is either overdetermined or underdetermined.  In particular, 
those kinds of issues often arise in mass compensation cases, where a 
connection between initial acts and resulting harms may not always be 
clear.   
Some conceptual tools exist to deal with the problem of act 
attenuation.  For example, unjust enrichment claims may elude act 
attenuation, because unjust enrichment depends only on a showing that 
a defendant was unjustly enriched.55 In addition, some scholars 
 
prove that living individuals have been adversely affected by a slave system that was 
ended over 150 years ago.”  Horowitz, supra note 58, at 6. 
52 See Forde-Mazrui, supra note 8, at 728-33 (discussing these arguments); see 
also Hylton, Framework, supra note 13, at 35-37 (discussing differences in Black 
and white family structure). 
53 See id. at 380-81 (“The linkage of victims and perpetrators for acts occurring 
in the immediate past is another trait of standard legal claims.”); see also Brophy, 
Some Problems, supra note 1, at 505 (“Closely related to the difficulty of 
identification of victims and wrongdoers is the requirement that there be a close 
connection between past wrong and present claim.”); Verdun, supra note 2, at 624 
(noting this requirement in affirmative action).  This is a common theme in tort law.  
See, e.g., F.R.C.P. 23 (setting out commonality requirement in class action lawsuits). 
54 Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 757-58 (1984) (quoting Warth v. Seldin, 422 
U.S. 490, 504 (1975). 
55 See Sebok, Two Concepts, supra note 15, at 1416-17.   
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suggest that courts are likely to overlook act attenuation concerns in 
certain cases, such as those involving personal injuries.56 However, 
the general route for overcoming act attenuation is a factual one, and 
claimants generally overcome the problem by showing evidence of 
causal links. 
Act attenuation is an important theme in any discussion of 
reparations.  In addition to the standard act attenuation concerns that 
arise in reparations, intergenerational mass harm claims such as slave 
reparations involve two more specialized variants of the lack of 
causation argument which I will address in turn. 
 
B. Victim Attenuation 
The first of the two more specialized concerns is what I will call 
victim attenuation.  Victim attenuation is the idea that modern 
claimants are insufficiently linked to original harmed parties.  This 
lack of connection creates victim attenuation, a concern which is 
typically present only in intergenerational claims.  Victim attenuation 
concerns arise not only in slavery reparations cases, but in others that 
seek compensation for intergenerational harms, including cases 
involving harms to Native Americans, Holocaust victims, and 
Japanese internees. 
In the slavery context, victim attenuation manifests in the argument 
that Blacks today are not sufficiently linked to slaves, and are thus 
undeserving of any recompense for slavery.57 The basic idea 
underlying this concern is intuitive.  Blacks living today were not 
directly subject to the harms of slavery.58 Many Blacks may be slave 
 
56 Id. at 1439-41. 
57 A related concern is that slave descendants today would not exist but for 
slavery, and therefore are not entitled to recompense.  See, e.g., Stephen Kershnar, 
The Inheritance-Based Claim to Reparations, 8 Legal Theory 243, 247-51 (2002). 
58 “Opponents also argue that African Americans today were never slaves and 
did not directly experience the injustices of slavery and its effects and thus are not 
entitled to any form of reparations.” Hall, supra note 9, at 30; see also Brophy, Some 
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descendants, but many others are more recent arrivals who lack that 
connection as well.59 Present claimants are not original victims, and 
may have a relatively low proportion of descent.   
This concern appears in the literature on reparations.  Stephen 
Kershnar argues that modern Blacks have only “token” rights of 
reparations because they are not sufficiently connected to slaves.60 
Keith Hylton suggests that reparations claims must be treated as 
derivative claims under tort law, which means that as a practical matter 
they will most likely fail.61 Al Brophy notes that “[f]ormulating a 
legal claim . . . involves linking past victims with people who are 
making a claim in the present—or what one might call present victims 
of past discrimination.”62 And media critics of reparations for slavery 
also emphasize victim attenuation.63 
Problems, supra note 1, at 518-20; Miller, supra note 9, at 52; David Horowitz, Ten 
Reasons Why Reparations for Blacks is a Bad Idea for Blacks - and Racist Too, 
Front Page Magazine, January 3, 2001. 
59 See Brophy, Some Problems, supra note 1, at 519; Posner & Vermeule, 
supra note 9, at 739; Graham Hughes, Reparations for Blacks?, 43 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 
1063, 1064 (1968) (noting difficulties in identifying plaintiffs); see also Linda 
Chavez, Promoting Racial Harmony, in The Affirmative Action Debate 314, 314-22 
(George E. Curry ed., 1996) (noting victim attenuation concerns relating to 
affirmative action); Verdun, supra note 2, at 623 (discussing victim attenuation in 
affirmative action); Posner & Vermeule, supra note 9, at 712 (same). 
60 Kershnar, supra note 57, at 251-58; see also Janna Thompson, Historical 
Injustice and Reparation:  Justifying Claims of Descendants, 112 Ethics 114, 116-21 
(2001) (suggesting that the passage of time precludes reparations). 
61 Hylton, Slavery, supra note 16, at 38-45. 
62 Brophy, Some Problems, supra note 1, at 504. 
63 For example, one critic argues that “it is obscene to think of this modern 
generation of black Americans profiting from the blood money drawn nearly 140 
years ago from the exploitation of slaves.”  Juan Williams, Slavery Isn’t the Issue, 
Wall Street Journal, April 14, 2002.  See also Adolph Reed, On Reparations, The 
Progressive, December 2000 (noting difficulty of connecting modern victims with 
slave ancestors); Merida, supra note 2, at C-01.  Merida notes that “Opponents say 
there is no precedent for paying people who are dead, that reparations are usually 
awarded to survivors.”  Merida, supra note 2, at C-01. 
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Victim attenuation concerns have been paramount in judicial 
decisions on reparations.  Victim attenuation directly affects the legal 
analysis of a claimant’s standing.  Thus, the Ninth Circuit Court of 
Appeals, in Cato v. United States, dismissed reparations claims 
brought against the government, stating that: 
Cato proceeds on a generalized, class-based grievance; 
she neither alleges, nor suggests that she might claim, 
any conduct on the part of any specific official or as a 
result of any specific program that has run afoul of a 
constitutional or statutory right and caused her a 
discrete injury.  Without a concrete, personal injury that 
is not abstract and that is fairly traceable to the 
government conduct that she challenges as 
unconstitutional, Cato lacks standing.64 
Similarly, the district court in the recent In re African-American 
Slave Descendants Litigation decision dismissed a number of 
consolidated claims in related cases brought against corporations.65 
The court wrote that: 
 
64 70 F.3d at 1109-110. The court elaborated, “she does not trace the presence 
of discrimination and its harm to the United States rather than to other persons or 
institutions. Accordingly, Cato lacks standing to bring a suit setting forth the claims 
she suggests.”  Id. 
65 In re African-American Slave Descendants Litigation, 375 F. Supp. 2d 721 
(N.D. Ill. 2005).  That consolidated case proceeded under a different theory than 
Cato; it was brought not against the government but against corporations whose 
predecessor entities had benefited from slavery.  Despite this difference, the issue of 
standing again proved decisive.  The court initially dismissed claims in January 
2004, giving leave to replead.  See In re African-American Slaves Descendants 
Litigation, 304 F. Supp. 2d 1027 (N.D. Ill. 2004).  In July 2005, the amended 
complaint was dismissed, in a substantially similar opinion.  375 F. Supp. 2d 721; 
see Anthony Sebok, “The Lawsuit Brought by African-Americans Seeking 
Compensation from Corporations for the Wrongs of Slavery:  Why the Opinion 
Dismissing the Suit is Unpersuasive,” Findlaw (August 8, 2005) [hereinafter Sebok, 
The Lawsuit] (available online at 
http://writ.news.findlaw.com/sebok/20050808.html) (noting similarity between the 
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Plaintiffs’ alleged injury is derivative of the injury 
inflicted upon enslaved African-Americans over a 
century ago. . . . This is insufficient to establish 
standing, and contrary to centuries of well-settled legal 
principles requiring that a litigant demonstrate a 
personal stake in an alleged dispute. . . . Plaintiffs 
cannot establish a personal injury sufficient to confer 
standing by merely alleging some genealogical 
relationship to African-Americans held in slavery over 
one- hundred, two-hundred, or three-hundred years 
ago.66 
Plaintiffs had sought to establish standing by arguing that they 
were slave descendants, and claiming that, as the rightful heirs of their 
ancestors’ assets, they suffered injury because their ancestors were not 
compensated for their labor.67 The court disagreed:  “Plaintiffs’ claim 
to the economic wealth of their ancestors’ labor is conjectural. While 
most would like to assume that they will be the beneficiaries of their 
ancestors’ wealth upon their demise, this is a mere assumption.”68 In 
addition, the court ruled that the plaintiffs did not meet the 
requirements for third party standing: “Plaintiffs have not alleged a 
legally sufficient relation to their ancestors. All that Plaintiffs allege is 
 
2004 decision dismissing the original complaint and the 2005 decision dismissing the 
amended complaint). 
The case was dismissed in part because of standing and attenuation issues, and 
in part because of the statute of limitations.  375 F. Supp. 2d at 770-80 (discussing 
statutes of limitation); id. at 775-80 (discussing exceptions to the statute of 
limitations); see generally Robinson, supra note 43, at 366-68 (discussing statutes of 
limitations); Wenger, supra note 1, at 244-48 (same). 
66 Id. at 748, 751. 
67 Id. at 748. 
68 Id. 
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a genealogical relationship, and more is required under the law in 
order to confer third-party standing.”69 
The difference between victim and act attenuation is subtle.  While 
act attenuation is an assertion that a claimant has suffered no legally 
cognizable harm, victim attenuation is an assertion that the claimant is 
a person who should not bring a claim at all.  In the context of 
descendant-based reparations suits, victim attenuation asserts that 
modern claimants are insufficiently linked to harmed parties, thus 
relying on act attenuation -- the lack of a connection between a tort 
inflicted on a slave and any perceived present day harm.  In the context 
of slave based reparations, victim attenuation is not dependent on act 
attenuation but rather on the intergenerational gap itself and on the 
idea that modern claimants are not good representatives of slaves, who 
may have themselves once had colorable claims.  Thus, concerns of 
victim and act attenuation are interrelated.  Victim attenuation 
problems of standing exist because courts are unsure that current 
claimants can show a harm to them.  The same perceived inability to 
show harm would inevitably create act attenuation concerns at any 
trial.  (However, a weaker connection between victims and harm may 
satisfy the victim attenuation standing concerns, while a stronger 
connection might eventually need to be shown to establish causation at 
trial.) 
Victim attenuation defenses potentially apply to both tort and 
unjust enrichment claims.  Victim attenuation has arisen in both sides 
of the Slave Descendants litigation, for example.  And both types of 
claims have foundered in court, due at least in part to victim 
attenuation.  (Conceptually, to the extent that victim attenutation is an 
outgrowth in part of act attenuation, then unjust enrichment claims – 
some of which are less subject to act attenuation -- may also be less 
susceptible to victim attenuation defenses.) 
 
69 Id. at 753.  As the court noted, the requirement is that the party asserting third 
party standing show some injury in fact, and that that party also show that prudential 
considerations weigh in its favor.  Id. at 752-53. 
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C. Wrongdoer Attenuation 
The third type of attenuation argument is wrongdoer attenuation.  
Wrongdoer attenuation exists because present-day citizens and 
governments may not be closely connected to slave owners, suggesting 
that perhaps they should not be required to pay for harms caused by 
slavery.70 Many modern non-Blacks are not descendants of slave 
owners, and have no apparent direct connections to them.71 All living 
 
70 See Brophy, Some Problems, supra note 1, at 519 (“The people who 
perpetrated the crimes of slavery are gone and their estates are (mostly) distributed. 
A few corporations survive and some of the money made from slavery is traceable to 
currently existing bank accounts.  However, there are significant problems in 
imposing the liability of past generations of private actors on the current 
generation.”); see also Matsuda, supra note 1, at 375 (“Of those taxpayers who must 
pay the reparations, some are direct descendants of perpetrators while others are 
merely guilty by association. Under a reparations doctrine, the working class whites 
whose ancestors never harbored any prejudice or ill-will toward the victim group are 
taxed equally with the perpetrators’ direct descendants for the sins of the past.”); 
Posner & Vermeule, supra note 9, at 736 (“Reparations are rarely paid by the 
original wrongdoers, that is, the individuals who performed the wrongful acts, 
whether or not on behalf of a state or corporate body. Substantive moral 
considerations must explain why nonwrongdoers—usually taxpayers or 
shareholders—should pay reparations; when these considerations fail, prudential 
considerations must be invoked.”); Hall, supra note 9, at 30 (“White America today 
attempts to distance itself from both the ‘sins of slavery’ and of its forefathers, in an 
effort to deny responsibility for the past and present problems associated with race.  
Opponents of African American reparations contend that slavery and past injustices 
by White Americans were not conducted by individuals living today, but rather by 
individuals long dead.”). 
71 This is recognized in the reparations literature.  See, e.g., Brophy, Some 
Problems, supra note 1, at 519; Verdun, supra note 2, at 629-30; Miller, supra note 
9, at 52. And many modern Americans may not feel any sort of link to slave owners.  
However, based on casual observation, there seems to be at least some degree of 
connection that many white southerners feel for former slaveholders.  This can be 
seen, for instance, in the detailed civil war role-playing activities; the continued 
prevalence of statues of confederate generals; the politically popular use of the 
confederate flag; and the resurgence of historical societies such as the Daughters of 
the Confederacy.  Reparations opponents may be more connected to the past, and in 
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defendants are a generation or more removed from slave owners.72 In 
addition, it is likely that most or all slave owner descendants have at 
least some ancestors that were nonslaveholders – and many are mixed 
descendants who have ancestry traceable both to slaveowners and to 
slaves themselves.73 All of this serves to greatly complicate the task of 
apportioning blame to living defendants.  Thus, Vincene Verdun sums 
up the concepts underlying wrongdoer attenuation as follows: 
From the dominant perspective, it would be patently 
unfair to make all white people or society pay for 
slavery because that would necessarily include people 
who did not participate in the wrong. These people 
include whites who are descendants of abolitionists and 
nonslaveholders, and immigrants, or descendants of 
immigrants, who came to this country after slavery was 
abolished; post slavery immigrants cannot be connected 
with a wrong associated with slavery.74 
particular to the slave-owning past, than they tend to admit in discussions about 
liability.  See Jason Zengerle, Lost Cause, The New Republic, August 2, 2004, at 14 
(discussing popularity of Confederate reenactment and historical groups); see also 
Carter Davis, Race and Reparations, Alabama City magazine, April 24, 2004, 
available online at 
http://www.al.com/news/citymagazine/index.ssf?/base/news/1082801701197890.xm
l, at 5 (noting concerns raised by opponents about the “legacy” of the University of 
Alabama when professor Al Brophy suggested the university investigate its slave 
owning past). 
72 Sebok, Two Concepts, supra note 15, at 1419-20. 
73 See Posner & Vermeule, supra note 9, at 740 (“The more difficult problem 
exists when the wrongdoing occurs on a large scale, and the wrongdoers and victims 
miscegenate, or their descendants miscegenate. A descendant of a victim might 
therefore also be the descendant of a wrongdoer.  With sufficient mixing, reparations 
become pointless. It makes no sense for a person to pay reparations from one pocket 
to the other. Even with more limited mixing, one must grapple with the question 
whether to treat people differently on the basis of how many ancestors belong to the 
class of victims and how many belong to the class of wrongdoers.”). 
74 Verdun, supra note 2, at 630; see also The Conversation, Wash. Post, July 
23, 2000, at F1 (“As a white woman, I am tired of being blamed for slavery 
because—and only because—I am white, when the fact of the matter is I am 
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Wrongdoer attenuation undercuts the moral force of reparations 
arguments, which are often presented as a demand for justice.75 
Wrongdoer attenuation arguments may take the form of statistics, such 
as noting the number of people who have arrived in the country since 
1865, the percent of the populace descendant from post-bellum 
immigrants, and so forth.76 
While victim attenuation may evoke the possibility of an 
unjustified windfall, wrongdoer attenuation brings the image of an 
unjustified penalty.77 That is a strongly negative image to overcome in 
a society which places high value, at least rhetorically, on the 
protection of the innocent.78 As Eric Posner and Adrian Vermeule 
 
descended from Irish and German immigrants who didn’t arrive on Ellis Island until 
well after the Civil War.”) (statement of Peggy Sakagawa); Massey, supra note 9, at 
162.  Brophy notes that legal liability “requires linking past perpetrators with people 
who currently exist.”  Brophy, Some Problems, supra note 1, at 504. 
75 Reparations advocates often use the language of culpability in reparations 
literature, though there has been some recent movement towards a less 
confrontational tone.  See Miller, supra note 9, at 49-52 (arguing that reparations 
advocates have created problems by being unnecessarily confrontational); see also 
Brophy, Some Problems, supra note 1, at 519 n.94 (“My point is that in talking about 
reparations for slavery and Jim Crow, one must be careful in talking about claims of 
victims against perpetrators, when many of the people against whom claims are 
being asserted are not perpetrators.”); Alfred Brophy, Taking Reparations Seriously, 
(Unpublished Manuscript), at 16 (“For many reparationists, the focus is upon past 
harm as a way of arguing for reparations.  Among others there seems to be little 
interest in reconciliation.  But those voices are not the leaders in the field.  They do 
not represent the most thoughtful reparationists.”).  See generally Lee A. Harris, 
Political Autonomy as a Form of Reparations, 29 Southern L. Rev. 25 (2001); Lee A. 
Harris, “Reparations” as a Dirty Word: The Norm Against Slavery Reparations, 33 
U. Memphis L. Rev. 409 (2003). 
76 See Horowitz, supra note 58, at 3-4. 
77 See Jeremy Waldron, Superceding Historic Injustice, 103 Ethics 4 (1992), at 
26-27 (noting these concerns).  In addition, reparations opponents sometimes suggest 
that past acts, such as the civil war, constitute sufficient payments for slavery.  See,
e.g., Posner & Vermeule, supra note 9, at 730-31 (noting this argument); Horowitz, 
supra note 58, at 9. 
78 Verdun, supra note 2, at 620-22. 
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note, “a strong tradition in the United States holds that individuals are 
not blameworthy for acts over which they have no control.”79 Group 
sanctions are an exception.80 
Wrongdoer attenuation has played a part in derailing proposed 
reparations legislation.  Representative Henry Hyde, then-chair of the 
House Judiciary Committee, argued that “the notion of collective guilt 
for what people did [200-plus] years ago, that this generation should 
pay a debt for that generation, is an idea whose time has gone.  I never 
owned a slave.  I never oppressed anybody.  I don’t know that I should 
have to pay for someone who did [own slaves] generations before I 
was born.”81 The political wrongdoer attenuation argument is couched 
in the moral language of wrong and right, rather than in legal 
language.82 Similar moral-inflected arguments are used by many 
prominent media critics of reparations.83 
79 Posner & Vermeule, supra note 9, at 699; Daryl Levinson, Collective 
Sanctions, 56 Stan. L. Rev. 345, 347-48 (2003); Brophy, Some Problems, supra note 
1, at 548 (noting that American law typically ties legal liability to moral culpability). 
80 In instances where group sanctions are tolerated, it is often as a form of 
deterrence, see id. at 348-49, and such consequentialist justification would not apply 
to the case of reparations for slavery.  See Massey, supra note 9, at 165 (noting that 
reparations have no deterrent value); see also Levinson, supra, at 347-48 (noting that 
Blacks have been subjected to collective sanctions in the past). 
81 See Merida, supra note 2, at C-01; see also 136 Cong. Rec. S1312-03, 
Statement of Sen. Bumpers (Feb. 21, 1990) (stating that “I am a son of the South. 
But I never owned a slave. My father never owned a slave” in arguing that modern 
Turkey should not be blamed for the Armenian genocide).    
82 See Eric Yamamoto, Racial Reparations: Japanese American Redress and 
African American Claims, 40 B.C. L. Rev. 477, 496-97 (1998) (discussing political 
component of reparations arguments). 
83 For example, Armstrong Williams criticizes the reparations movement for 
“seek[ing] to penalize our current government for what white slave holders did 
centuries ago.”  Armstrong Williams, Presumed Victims, in Should America Pay?, 
supra note 1, at 165, 167; see also id. at 170 (noting conceptual difficulty in 
assessing reparations against post-bellum immigrants).  John McWhorter argues that 
some “obvious retorts” to the idea of reparations include “that many whites in 
America today arrived after emancipation [and] that many whites owned no slaves.”  
John McWhorter, Against Reparations, in Should America Pay?, supra note 1, at 
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Like victim attenuation, wrongdoer attenuation is not strictly a 
causation argument.  Rather, it is an attack on the identity of the party 
against whom a claim is made.  And like victim attenuation, it may be 
used in tandem with more traditional act attenuation arguments.  
However, unlike victim attenuation, it is not limited to cases of 
intergenerational harm.  “You got the wrong guy, judge,” is a standard 
line of defense in many cases.  And wrongdoer attenuation intersects 
with other kinds of attenuation, including act attenuation, in various 
ways.84 
191.  David Horowitz has stated that reparations are inappropriate because “only a 
tiny minority of white Americans ever owned slaves” and “most [modern] 
Americans have no connection (direct or indirect) to slavery,” among other reasons.  
Horowitz, supra note 58, at 1.  This article was widely distributed and received 
nationwide attention.  See Brophy, Cultural War, supra note 3, at 1201.  Michelle 
Malkin writes that reparations advocates seek payments from “the U.S. government, 
which means American taxpayers, which means tens of millions of people who had 
nothing remotely whatsoever to do with inflicting such injustice on anyone.”  
Michelle Malkin, Get Out Your Reparations Calculator, TownHall.com, August 15, 
2002, available online at 
http://www.townhall.com/columnists/michellemalkin/mm20020815.shtml . 
Other, less oppositional voices have also wondered about these concerns. Kevin 
Merida, a relatively sympathetic Washington Post reporter, frames the potential issue 
as:   “Why should American taxpayers who never owned slaves pay for the sins of 
ancestors they don’t even know? And what about those whose ancestors arrived here 
long after slavery ended?”  Merida, supra note 2, at C-01. 
 
84 One strain of wrongdoer attenuation argument is similar to the idea of 
overdetermination.  That is, modern parties can assert the wrongdoer attenuation 
argument that “Even if my ancestor had decided to pay his slaves, the generalized 
harm to slave descendants would have taken place anyway.” 
This is an overdetermination argument, similar to saying that “since a hundred 
other people also poisoned the well, my own act of poisoning the well should not be 
viewed as causative of decedent’s death.”  Thus, it is similar to the legal doctrine of 
substantial factor (that is, that a defendant is not liable unless her acts were a 
substantial factor in causing a harm).  See infra Part IV.B.4 (discussing substantial 
factor).  This kind of argument, while internally consistent, lacks the moral force of 
most wrongdoer attenuation arguments.   
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The strength of wrongdoer attenuation arguments will vary with a 
number of factors, primarily the party against whom a claim is 
asserted.  Thus, this line of defense can be partially avoided though 
smart lawyering.  Many reparations claims are brought against 
corporations, and these corporate entities may in fact be the same legal 
entity as that which originally harmed slaves.  Because this step avoids 
wrongdoer attenuation, many reparations cases involve such long-lived 
entities.85 But that move, while lessening wrongdoer attenuation, can 
increase act attenuation, since the particular corporate entity against 
whom suit is brought may be removed from direct participation in 
harmful acts.  (There are exceptions to this general trend.  For 
example, Holocaust litigants bringing suit against Ford Motor 
Company for its use of slave labor avoided both wrongdoer attenuation 
– the company was the same entity – and act attenuation, since the link 
between the act and the harm was clear).86 
Like victim attenuation, wrongdoer attenuation may be a less 
compelling defense against claims of unjust enrichment.  This is 
because unjust enrichment claims are not based on the guilt of a 
particular defendant, only on a showing that he has been enriched.  
Despite this theoretical advantage, wrongdoer attenuation concerns 
were voiced by the Slave Descendants court as it dismissed reparations 
claims, noting that “the allegations of Plaintiff’s Complaint do not link 
these Defendants to the alleged harm”87 and that the “Complaint is 
devoid of any allegations that connect the specifically named 
 
85 There are conceptual questions about the validity of corporate punishment 
over time, since the burden falls on shareholders who were not owners of the 
corporation at the time the wrong occurred.  See generally John C. Coffee, No Soul 
to Damn: No Body to Kick:  An Unscandalized Enquiry into the Problem of 
Corporate Punishment, 79 Michigan Law Review 386 (1981) (discussing theoretical 
problems with punishing corporate entities). 
86 See generally Michael Bazyler, Nuremberg in America:  Litigating the 
Holocaust in United States Courts, 34 U. Rich. L. Rev. 1, 204-06 (2000) (discussing 
Ford litigation) 
87 Id. at 749 (emphasis added). 
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Defendants or their predecessors and any of the Plaintiffs or their 
ancestors.”88 
D. Recap 
These three types of attenuation are used, often together, to suggest 
that reparations for slavery would not be appropriate.  These critiques 
are not unique to the case of Black slavery, and similar arguments 
apply in most or all reparations-type actions.89 
The problem of attenuation arises repeatedly in the literature.  
Many commenters suggest that attenuation fatally undercuts the case 
for reparations.  Such an assessment reflects judicial reality at present.  
The Slave Descendants court based parts of its opinion on all three 
types of attenuation.   It mentioned wrongdoer attenuation — “the 
allegations of Plaintiff’s Complaint do not link these Defendants to the 
alleged harm”90 — and act attenuation — “Plaintiffs’ complaint is 
devoid of any allegations that any specific conduct of the Defendants 
was a cause of the continuing injuries of which Plaintiffs complain.”91 
In particular, the Slave Descendants court, like the Cato court, focused 
on victim attenuation — “Plaintiffs cannot establish a personal injury 
sufficient to confer standing”.92 Thus, the problems of victim, 
 
88 Id. at 740. 
89 See Matsuda, supra note 1, at 372 (discussing attenuation defense in 
connection with reparations claims by Native Hawaiians); see also Posner & 
Vermeule, supra note 9, at 699-711 (noting these types of objections to reparations 
generally). 
90 Id. at 749 (emphasis added).  The Court also wrote that the “Complaint is 
devoid of any allegations that connect the specifically named Defendants or their 
predecessors and any of the Plaintiffs or their ancestors,” wrote the court. Id. at 740. 
91 Id. at 750. 
92 Id. at 748-51; see also id. at 1067-68 (“Plaintiffs’ Complaint fails to connect 
any alleged injury of any one of the Plaintiffs or their ancestors to alleged conduct by 
any one of the Defendants or their predecessors. . . . [T]he allegations in a complaint 
must be those relating to the plaintiff, not those of someone else.”). 
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wrongdoer, and act attenuation certainly have been decisive in 
derailing reparations suits in court.93 
III. Effects 
The presence of all three kinds of attenuation creates a particularly 
difficult hurdle for reparations.  Attenuation concerns operate in legal 
and moral arenas to create doubts about the viability of any judicial or 
legislative progress towards a reparations settlement.94 
93 Other reparations cases in the courts have largely followed the reasoning of 
Cato without further discussion.  See Bell v. United States, No. Civ. A. 
301CV0338D, 2001 WL 1041792, at *2 (N.D.Tex. Aug.31, 2001) (citing Cato in 
holding that plaintiff lacked standing); Bey v. United States Department of Justice, 
No. 95 CIV 10401, 1996 WL 413684, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. July 24, 1996) (same); 
Langley v. United States, No. C 95-4227, 1995 WL 714378, at *2 (N.D.Cal. Nov.30, 
1995) (same); see also Himiya v. United States, No. 94 C 4065, 1994 WL 376850, 
*2 (N.D.Ill. July 15, 1994) (citing Cato in dismissing on sovereign immunity 
grounds). 
94 Attenuation concerns are manifested in two different spheres.  First, 
attenuation comes up in the moral sphere, with concerns that it is somehow wrong 
for reparations to be paid by those who are not connected to slavery.  Cf. Forde-
Mazrui, supra note 8, at 685 (discussing moral arguments about reparations and 
affirmative action).  Second, attenuation arises in the legal sphere, with objections 
that reparations cannot for legal reasons be paid to plaintiffs who lack standing, or a 
more direct connection to the slaves who were harmed.  See, e.g. supra sections II.A 
through II.D (discussing the legal effects of attenuation). 
These are opposite sides of the same coin.  Massey, supra note 9, at 157 
(“When grappling with providing reparations for slavery, two distinct categories of 
issues emerge: legal and political.”).  And just as the idea of reparations is based on a 
joint legal and moral argument, attenuation provides a joint legal and moral counter-
argument.  See Miller, supra note 9, at 50 (“Reparations, on this account, involves a 
demand for restoration of the ill-gotten gains of slavery to the group that was 
wronged. In so doing, it suggests both a legal strategy and an emotionally compelling 
moral argument.  The legal strategy requires us to identify the various ways that 
blacks were harmed by whites who profited from slavery and then to sue for the 
repayment of those profits either to individuals or into some central fund for more 
general disbursement.  The moral argument asserts that whites as a group were, and 
continue to be, responsible for the ills of the African American community.  It is the 
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It is often suggested in the reparations literature suggests that 
successful resolution of slave reparations litigation may be a natural 
extension of other successful mass litigation, such as restitution to 
Holocaust victims or Japanese internees.95 However, it is significant 
that there is no major success story in mass litigation that has 
overcome the presence of all three kinds of attenuation.
In particular, the Holocaust victim cases did not involve the level 
of victim attenuation present in slave reparations.  As Bert Neuborne, 
who helped lead the Holocaust restitution effort, writes, “the 
Holocaust cases dealt with a first-generation effort” to return 
“identifiable property from the unjustly enriched owner of the property 
to its true owner or a close relative.”96 Thus, the Holocaust lawsuits 
did not suffer from the same levels of victim attenuation that plague 
slavery reparations suits.  The settlement provided limited recovery for 
heirs of very recently deceased class members, but nothing nearly on 
the level that slave reparations would require.97 The Holocaust 
 
power and simplicity of that moral claim that makes reparations at once so 
compelling an argument and so difficult for the vast majority of whites to endorse.”); 
cf. Yamamoto, supra note 82, at 518 (“Those seeking reparations need to draw on 
the moral force of their claims (and not frame it legally out of existence) while 
simultaneously radically recasting reparations in a way that both materially benefits 
those harmed and generally furthers some larger interests of mainstream America.”). 
95 See, e.g., Brophy, Some Problems, supra note 1, at 499-500 (“A second 
factor leading to the reinvigoration of talk about reparations for slavery and Jim 
Crow laws are the models of reparations that other groups -- Native Americans, 
Holocaust victims, Japanese Americans interned during World War II, South 
Africans -- have obtained.”). 
96 Bert Neuborne, Holocaust Reparations Litigation, Lessons for the Slavery 
Reparations Movement, 58 NYU Ann. Surv. Am. L. 615, 621 (2003); Brophy, Some 
Problems, supra note 1, at 512 (noting that Holocaust recompense claims differ from 
slave reparations because “there are quite specific claims for identifiable property or 
specific torts.”). 
97 See Madeline Doms, Compensation for Survivors of Slave and Forced Labor: 
The Swiss Bank Settlement and the German Foundation Provide Options for 
Recovery for Holocaust Survivors, 14 Transnat'l Law. 171, 199 n.204 (2001) (noting 
provision for distribution to heirs of class members who are deceased, but only for 
those who die after the settlement date).   
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litigation also avoided wrongdoer attenuation by focusing on existing 
governments and corporate entities.98 Thus, the litigation arguably 
only suffered from one type of attenuation, act attenuation.   
Neuborne notes this difference, writing that largely due to 
attenuation problems, “the lines of identity have become so blurred” in 
slave reparations, “today’s remedy may be more political than legal.”99 
That assessment alone does not mean that reparations litigation is 
fruitless.  The reparations movement, like the Holocaust compensation 
movement before it, is composed of “an untidy mixture of law, 
politics, and raw emotion.”100 In the Holocaust cases, legal claims did 
not prevail qua legal claims, but rather allowed advocates to keep the 
public eye on the issue until defendants chose to settle.101 
Nevertheless, it is instructive to note that the Holocaust litigation, 
which many advocates see as a model for slave reparations, differs 
significantly in its vulnerability to attenuation arguments.  
Other successful mass restitution cases are no more encouraging.  
The claims brought on behalf of Japanese internees did not suffer from 
victim attenuation.  The claimants were the same people who had been 
interned.102 Similarly, the massive tobacco litigation, which resulted 
in a settlement, did not suffer from the same attenuation problems.103 
The tobacco companies were the original harming parties, and the 
claimants were the original victims.  Significantly, in some strands of 
related tobacco litigation that did introduce victim attenuation 
concerns, the cases were dismissed.  For example, qui-tam-like claims 
 
98 See generally Sebok, Two Concepts, supra note 15, at 1406-10 (discussing 
the litigation history of the Holocaust cases). 
99 Neuborne, supra note 96, at 621. 
100 Id. at 619. 
101 Id. (“The litigation was as much about politics as it was about law . . . . Law 
provided the roadmap [for settlement], but did not necessarily provide the fuel.”). 
102 See Hylton, Framework, supra note 13, at 32-33; Dale Minami, Japanese-
American Redress, 6 Afr.-Am. L. & Pol’y Rep. 27 (2004). 
103 Some reparations advocates have suggested that the use of restitution theory 
to extract a settlement in the tobacco cases is a possible model for reparations.  See 
Sebok, Two Concepts, supra note 15, at 1406. 
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under the Medicare Secondary Payer Act, which suffered from 
conceptual separation similar to victim attenuation, were eventually 
dismissed.104 
Indeed, the cases that have manifested all three kinds of 
attenuation are most striking for their failure to achieve a satisfactory 
resolution.  Cases involving claims brought on behalf of Native 
Americans are similar to reparations cases, in that they involve victim 
attenuation, act attenuation, and wrongdoer attenuation.  These cases 
have not generally been successful.105 No generalized tort- or human-
rights-based action for crimes against Native Americans has 
succeeded.  Where Native American redress claims have succeeded, it 
has been on the basis of treaties signed with individual tribes.  (Of 
course, no such treaties exist in the slave context).  Indeed, it is not 
overstatement to say that no case which suffered from all three kinds of 
attenuation has successfully proceeded to a successful resolution 
through trial or settlement. This is a dire diagnosis for reparations. 
It is questionable exactly how many types of attenuation can be 
present in a case before the case collapses.  Obviously, one type alone 
can be fatal in some cases.  But can a case ever succeed if it faces three 
types of attenuation?  This is unclear.  It may be possible to address 
one or more kinds, such as through efforts by reparations advocates to 
address wrongdoer attenuation by bringing suit against corporate 
entities.  But as noted in that discussion, that solution only increased 
act attenuation.  Is it possible to deal with all three types at once?  That 
is the challenge that reparations advocates face, and it is a primary 
reason that reparations claims are failing today.  Because of the 
presence of all three kinds of attenuation, it is not clear that reparations 
 
104 Claims under the Medicare Secondary Payer Act were brought to collect for 
tobacco-related expenses of patients paid by Medicare.  See Mason v. American 
Tobacco Co., 212 F. Supp.2d 88 (E.D.N.Y. 2002) (dismissing these claims). 
105 See generally Lindsay Glauner, The Need for Accountability and 
Reparation: 1830-1976 The United States Government's Role in the Promotion, 
Implementation, and Execution of the Crime of Genocide Against Native Americans, 
51 DePaul L. Rev. 911 (2002). 
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litigation can ever succeed.  If it does, it will be a trailblazer, the first 
case to succeed facing all three kinds of attenuation.  It is sobering to 
note that only by overcoming attenuation in a truly unprecedented 
manner could reparations cases succeed in court. 
Ultimately, however, reparations cases may not be best suited for 
success in court.106 Most of the major cases that reparations advocates 
often seek to emulate, including the Holocaust litigation, tobacco 
litigation, and suits for Americans of Japanese Ancestry, succeeded 
not through judicial fiat but through negotiated settlement.107 
Successful emulation of that model means keeping a court case alive, 
in order to keep up consistent legal pressure while moral and political 
arguments are brought to bear.  However, that court case need not 
ultimately be a legal winner itself.  The key for reparations at this 
juncture is to continue to advance ideas, particularly ideas that could 
counter the thorny problems created by attenuation.   
 
IV. Using the Tools of Mass Torts to Address Attenuation in the 
Courts 
It is very surprising that, despite the profound analogy between 
attenuation and similar concerns that come up in mass tort, there has 
been very little discussion thus far of how to apply mass tort concepts 
in the reparations context.108 Courts and scholars have addressed 
 
106 Many reparations advocates candidly admit that reparations are unlikely to 
be awarded at trial, and that the most fruitful route is legislative act or some sort of 
settlement  Westley, supra note 48, at 436 (arguing that it is Congress, and possibly 
state legislatures, that must be persuaded to enact reparations); Brophy, Some 
Problems, supra note 1, at 534-39 (noting need for development of dialogue and 
scholarship to address the possibility of settlement); Miller, supra note 9, at 51-57 
(suggesting that settlement is more likely to be successful than litigation); Wenger, 
supra note 1, at 256-58 (same). 
107 See Sebok, Two Concepts, supra note 15, at 1405-16 (noting history of 
tobacco and Holocaust litigation). 
108 The major exception is Hackney, supra note 9, which briefly discusses some 
of these concepts. 
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complicated issues of causation in the mass tort context.  Indeed, 
slavery itself can be viewed as one of the earliest mass torts. 
In this Part, I will explore the analogy between reparations and 
mass torts.  I do this as follows:  Section A will discuss some of the 
issues of causation that arise in the mass tort context, and Section B 
will examine similarities between causation issues in mass torts and in 
reparations.   
 
A. Similarities Between Reparations Concerns and Mass Tort 
Concerns. 
Using the terminology developed in Part II of this Article, we can 
see how attenuation relates to the previously examined categories of 
attenuation.  It is evident that the problems of attenuation that affect 
mass torts have much in common with those that plague reparations 
lawsuits.  Mass torts present the same concerns of victim, wrongdoer 
and act attenuation.  
In both cases the real problem is the same.  There is a potential 
connection between claimants and payers, but it is of undeterminable 
strength.  It is hard to match the victim to the wrongdoer, and to match 
the parties to the harm.   
In fact, many mass tort issues could be reframed, using the 
categories of attenuation we have previously discussed.  For example, 
the problems of tracing a particular cancer to a defendant’s product are 
created by act attenuation.  The problem of identifying a culpable 
defendant from among a pool who have manufactured fungible 
products in a large market is a problem of wrongdoer attenuation.  And 
the problem of connecting a harm to children and grandchildren of the 
originally harmed party — the so-called “DES granddaughters” — are 
problems of victim attenuation.  In addition, the causation problem 
related to the victim attenuation concern of standing. 
For example, the different types of attenuation are visible in the 
litigation surrounding the drug diethylstilbestrol, better known as 
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DES.109 DES was a drug commonly given to pregnant women over a 
period of time, and it ultimately proved to have deleterious effects on 
many of the children of those women.110 Litigants in the many strands 
of DES litigation faced victim attenuation defenses, since the 
daughters and granddaughters of women who took DES brought 
claims for harms done to them.  (Ultimately, the litigants with the 
biggest victim attenuation problem, DES granddaughters, did not have 
great success in court).  Litigants also faced wrongdoer attenuation 
problems as in some cases it was difficult to trace DES pills to a 
particular manufacturer.  Finally, litigants faced act attenuation 
concerns as they sought to link their harms to the drug (though for 
DES litigants, act attenuation was  not a big hurdle as causation was 
established early for some harms).   The mass tort issues as mapped 
onto an attenuation grid would follow along these lines:  Wrongdoer 
attenuation is similar to difficulties in tracing harm to a specific 
tortfeasor111; victim attenuation is similar to tracing harm to later 
victims, particularly in cases such as the DES granddaughters; and act 
attenuation is similar to the problem of linking harm to a defendant’s 
actions.   
As in the mass tort context, the harm to modern slave descendants 
caused by of slavery is of underdetermined causation.  Like the case of 
ships and safeguards, like in the case of DES granddaughters or Agent 
Orange veterans, we cannot know if a defendant’s alternate choice not 
to enslave would have resulted in greater assets being given to any 
particular slave descendant.  Since reparations presents a problem 
 
109 See Richard M. Russell, Note, The Causation Requirement:  Guardian of 
Fairness or Obstacle to Justice?  Making Sense of a Decade of DES Litigation, 25 
Suffolk U. L. Rev. 1071, 1071-81 (1991) (discussing DES litigation). 
110 Id. (collecting sources). 
111 Also, issues of wrongdoer attenuation may arise in addressing successor 
liability for damages.  See generally Michael D. Green, Successor Liability:  The 
Superiority of Statutory Reform to Protect Products Liability Claimants, 72 Cornell 
L. Rev. 17 (1986) (discussing theoretical successor liability issues). 
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analogous to mass torts, it is helpful to see how courts have addressed 
these issues in the mass torts context. 
 
B. Addressing Attenuation in Mass Torts 
Tort law in general, and mass torts in particular, has developed 
means of dealing with underdetermination. While uattenuation ed 
causation may complicates the legal inquiry, it does not altogether rule 
out a finding of legal causation.  This Section will discuss how tort law 
has dealt with attenuation.  Loss of chance will be discussed in Section 
1, burden shifting in Section 2, market share liability in Section 3 and 
substantial factor in Section 4.  Finally, Section 5 will focus on the use 
of statistical evidence.   
 
1. Loss of Chance 
The tort system allows recovery in some underdetermined cases.112 
A useful example is the imposition of liability for those ships that did 
not adequately protect against being washed overboard.  In a well-
known law review article, Wex Malone studied these cases and found 
that courts moved from a policy of not imposing liability to a policy of 
imposing liability nearly all of the time.113 Significantly, courts were 
willing to impose liability despite the conceptual difficulty of not 
knowing whether the victim would have been in a position to benefit 
from the increase in safety.114 “It would be futile for the courts to 
recognize a duty to provide emergency equipment and to impose an 
obligation to proceed promptly to the rescue if the defendant could 
always seize upon the uncertainty which nearly always attends the 
 
112 See Twerski & Sebok, supra note 34, at 1381; Malone, supra note 30, at 72-
73. 
113 Malone, supra note 30, at 75-77. 
114 Twerski & Sebok, supra note 34, at 1380; Gray, supra note 8, at 97-100 & 
n.18 (discussing cases). 
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rescue operation as a reason for dismissing the claim,” noted 
Malone.115 
Tort scholars have suggested various theoretical approaches 
explaining why courts should allow liability even where causation is 
underdetermined.  Wex Malone refers to many of these cases as 
involving the loss of a “gambler’s chance.”116 In such cases, a 
defendant facilitates the realization of an independently created risk.117 
Courts are not always willing to find liability in gambler’s chance 
cases, however, and are most willing to find liability in cases where a 
defendant had notice of a potential harm.118 Similarly, courts are more 
willing to find liability where defendants violated a rule “designed to 
protect” against the harm that in fact occurred.119 The gambler’s 
chance lost by slave descendants is likely to be quite substantial. 120 
2. Burden Shifting 
Burden shifting is also efficient, in many cases where is is 
impossible to show either causation or non-causation.121 Summers v. 
Tice is the classic case involving a hunting accident where it was 
impossible to determine which of two negligent shooters had caused 
the injury.122 The court held that “practical justice” allowed the 
 
115 Malone, supra note 30, at 75-77. 
116 Id. at 80; see also Twerski & Sebok, supra note 34, at 1381.  The loss of the 
gambler’s chance can be a significant loss; in many instances, without a defendant’s 
actions, “some value would have been preserved.”  Malone, supra note 30, at 80. 
117 Twerski & Sebok, supra note 34, at 1383.  See also id. at 1383-84 (giving 
examples); Robert L. Rabin, Enabling Torts, 49 DePaul L. Rev. 435, 439-48 (1999).   
118 Twerski & Sebok, supra note 34, at 1385-86. 
119 Malone, supra note 30, at 72. 
120 Hylton, Slavery, supra note 16, at 39, suggests that descendants might have 
an approximately forty percent chance of inheriting excess wealth from four 
generations removed.   Id. at 39. 
121 Robinson, supra note 30, at 721-26; Gray, supra note 8, at 117-18 
(discussing burden shifting). 
122 Id. at 715; 33 Cal. 2d 80, 86-88 (1948).  The court ruled that both hunters 
could be held liable.  Id.; see also Malone, supra note 30, at 83 (stating that the court 
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burden to shift to defendants, to establish that they were not the cause 
of harm.123 
A similar approach appears in some mass tort cases.  The court in 
Bichler v. Eli Lilly, a DES case, noted: 
There have been several approaches in tort law 
available to a plaintiff confronted with more than one 
actor who could be the causation in fact. In such 
instances where each such party acted independently 
but tortiously and it is proved that injury has been 
caused to plaintiff by only one of them, but there is 
uncertainty as to which one caused it, and where each 
can be joined as a defendant in the case, some courts 
have shifted the burden of proof of causation in fact to 
the defendants.124 
That court also found that since defendants had acted in a similar 
manner, and were aware of the possibility of harm, they could be held 
liable, even if the harm could not be directly traced to one particular 
defendant.125 Other DES courts have also adopted some version of 
group liability.126 This is similar to the idea of “enterprise liability,” 
 
was unwilling to let “two wrongdoers pass the ball”); Keeton et al., supra note 8, at 
271 (“It seems a very desirable solution where negligence on the part of both 
defendants is very clear, and it is only the issue of causation which is in doubt, so 
that the choice must be made between letting the loss due to failure of proof fall on 
the innocent plaintiff or the culpable defendants.”); Gray, supra note 8, at 102-04 
(same). 
123 33 Cal. 2d 80, 86-88 (1948). 
124 Bichler v. Eli Lilly and Co., 79 A.D.2d 317, 324-25 (N.Y. App. Div. 1981). 
125 Id. at 325-26. 
126 See, e.g., Collins v. Eli Lilly & Co., 116 Wis. 2d 166 (1984); see generally 
Robert A. Baruch Bush, Between Two Worlds: The Shift from Individual to Group 
Responsibility in the Law of Causation of Injury, 33 UCLA L. Rev. 1473, 1483-97 
(1986) (discussing several DES cases).  This development was also rejected by some 
courts.  See, e.g., Payton v. Abbott Laboratories, 386, Mass. 540 (1982). 
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which was applied in other mass tort settings to find that all actors in 
an industry are liable for foreseeable harms.127 
On DES granddaughters, courts have divided in those cases, with 
some courts allowing DES granddaughters to pursue claims against the 
DES manufacturers, and other courts barring these claims.128 The 
burden shifting used by some DES courts is dispositive, since typically 
defendants are as unable to disprove causation as plaintiffs are unable 
to prove it.129 
Scholars have suggested that courts are most likely to shift 
burdens, either explicitly or implicitly, and find liability in 
underdetermined causation cases where certain other factors are 
present.  For example, courts are more willing to find liability if the 
tort is an intentional tort, or if its harm is easily foreseeable.130 Courts 
may reject cases where the chance of harm is particularly low.131 And 
 
127 See, e.g., Hall v. E. I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co., Inc., 345 F. Supp. 353 
(E.D.N.Y. 1972).   
128 See id. at 251-61 (discussing cases); DeMayo v. Schmitt, No. 625, 1989 
Phila. Cty. Rptr. LEXIS 73, at *1 (C.P. Philadelphia County Dec. 28, 1989) 
(allowing claim for negligence to be stated); Enright v. Eli Lilly & Co., 570 N.E. 2d 
198 (N.Y. 1991) (claim could not proceed because of preconception tort doctrine); 
McMahon v. Eli Lilly & Co., 774 F.2d 830 (7th Cir. 1985) (permitting third 
generation claim); Bowe v. Abbott Laboratories, 608 N.E. 2d 223 (Ill. App. 1992); 
Grover v. Eli Lilly & Co., 591 N.E. 2d 696 (Ohio 1992) (denying recovery); see 
generally Julie A. Greenberg, Reconceptualizing Preconception Torts, 64 Tenn. L. 
Rev. 315, 320-28 (discussing the cases). 
129 Robinson, supra note 30, at 729. 
130 Twerski & Sebok, supra note 34, at 1381; Malone, supra note 30, at 73, 85-
87. 
131 See Twerski & Sebok, supra note 34, at 1387 (noting that the lower the 
probability that defendant’s act was not a cause, the higher the probability of a court 
imposing liability); see also id. at 1387-90 (discussing the difficulty of dealing with 
low probabilities in a world of full compensation).  The conceptual problem is that a 
court may be faced with two unpleasant choices:  either to overdeter, or to allow 
defendants to escape liability entirely.  Id.
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they may be likely to find liability where a party engaged in 
particularly noxious acts.132 
3. Market Share Liability 
Market share liability is a unique application of burden shifting.  
Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories used burden shifting, holding defendant 
DES manufacturers liable unless they could show that they did not 
cause plaintiffs’ harm.133 The court held that since multiple actors 
contributed to the harm, and causation was not individually traceable, 
all of the potential contributors could be held responsible.134 Sindell 
has been called  “modified Summers” case because it allowed 
defendants to pay in proportion to the harm they caused.135 The court 
adopted reasoning similar to Summers, noting that “as between an 
innocent plaintiff and negligent defendants, the latter should bear the 
cost of the injury.”136 
4. Substantial Factor 
Courts may apply the “substantial factor” test, allowing liability in 
cases where a defendant’s actions were a substantial factor leading to 
the plaintiff’s harm.137 A defendant’s actions will be considered a 
substantial factor in causing a harm if they “satisf[y] the but-for test 
 
132 See id. at 1386 (suggesting that the very production of handguns carries 
culpability); Rabin, supra note 117, at 453 (noting that handguns are designed for a 
dangerous purpose). 
133 Id. at 717; see 26 Cal. 3d 588, cert. denied, 449 U.S. 912 (1980).  The court 
opted to make the DES manufacturers show that they did not cause the injury, rather 
than making the victims show causation.  Robinson, supra note 30, at 714-15.  The 
court adopted this position in part because it was easier for defendants to maintain 
the kind of data that could be used to either show, or disprove, causation.  Id. at 734. 
134 Id. at 729. 
135 Gray, supra note 8, at 105-06. 
136 26 Cal. 3d at 610-11. 
137 Malone, supra note 30, at 89-95 (discussing the substantial factor test). 
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(with an exception for simultaneous independent sufficient causes) 
[and are] an appreciable and continuously effective or efficient factor 
in producing the harm, up to the time of occurrence of the harm.”138 
The substantial factor test allows courts to decide whether there is 
close enough affinity for the law to intervene and label a defendant’s 
conduct “wrong.”139 
Another useful analysis of substantial factor causation can be 
found in the district court opinion in Hamilton v. Accu-Tek, which 
dealt with a class action suit against handgun manufacturers for the 
harms caused by negligent distribution of handguns.140 The court asks 
whether a defendants’ conduct was a “significant contributing factor in 
the development” of a harm or “a substantial factor . . . increasing the 
probability” of plaintiffs’ harm.141 The underlying inquiry, as 
suggested by commentators, was “if defendants had behaved 
differently, how many fewer plaintiffs would have been harmed?”142 
138 Wright, supra note 7, at 1781-82; see also Robinson, supra note 30, at 751 
(noting that the substantial factor test is similar to the but-for test). One benefit of the 
substantial factor test is that it prevents minor causes from creating liability.  Id. at 
715-16. 
139 Malone, supra note 30, at 72. 
140 Hamilton v. Accu-Tek, 62 F.Supp.2d 802 (E.D.N.Y. 1999), rev’d on other 
grounds, 264 F.3d 21 (2d Cir. 2001). 
141 62 F.Supp.2d at 838. 
142 Twerski & Sebok, supra note 34, at 1403-04.  The judge noted that the 
defendants’ conduct was a “significant contributing factor in the development” of the 
ultimate harm.  62 F.Supp.2d at 838.  The evidence, wrote the court,  
was sufficient to permit a reasonable jury to conclude that the 
negligent marketing and distribution of handguns by manufacturers 
was a substantial factor in the promotion and development of an 
underground illegal market supplying New York criminals, and 
thus increasing the probability of death or serious injury [to 
plaintiffs].   
Id. On the jury’s role in assessing punishment, see generally Kaimipono David 
Wenger & David A. Hoffman, Nullificatory Juries, 2003 Wisc. L. Rev. 1115, 1148-
56. 
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The substantial factor test can be a useful tool to allocate liability 
in cases involving overdetermined causation.  Where a number of 
factors could each have created a harm, substantial factor analysis can 
be used to differentiate which factors should be held legally liable.   
 
5. Statistical Evidence 
Faced with a variety of difficulties in showing causation in mass 
tort cases, advocates, scholars, and courts have developed methods for 
showing causation through statistical evidence.  Scholars have argued 
that a “probabilistic approach to causation” is proper in cases where a 
large number of plaintiffs have been harmed by a group of defendants, 
and where intervening causation is possible, resulting in inability to 
definitely trace any individual plaintiff’s injury to an individual 
defendant’s actions.143 In these cases, scholars suggest that the amount 
recovered should be based on a “probability of causation” for a 
defendant.144 
In Agent Orange, Judge Weinstein suggested that plaintiffs would 
divide any recovery to reflect the statistical increase in likelihood of 
harm they suffered.  To address a complex problem of 
underdetermination, Judge Weinstein applied statistical causation, 
 
143 Robinson, supra note 30, at 759-60; Gold, supra note 39, at 384 (noting that 
mass tort cases rarely involve particularistic evidence); Wendy Wagner, Note, Trans-
Science in Torts, 96 Yale L.J. 428, 433 n.28 (collecting cases); Mario J. Rizzo & 
Frank S. Arnold, Causal Apportionment in the Law of Torts: An Economic Theory, 
80 Colum. L. Rev. 1399 (1980) (advocating the use of probabilistic causation in 
multiple cause cases). 
144 Id. at 749-66; see also Bush, supra note 126, at 1490-92; Jack B. Weinstein 
and Robert Kushen, Scientific Evidence in Complex Litigation, C-607 ALI-ABA 
Course of Study, July 24, 1991, at 709, 724 (“Statistical data may . . . permit 
combinations of anecdotal and valid statistical data to prove guilt or establish some 
material proposition of fact.”); but cf. Wright, supra note 7, at 1827 (suggesting that 
such devices may result in the tort system becoming more of a wealth redistribution 
system and less of a corrective justice system, and that such a change would be 
unfortunate). 
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using a type of proportional liability in allocating damages.145 
Statistical, pro rata distribution of damages was used because of the 
problem of indeterminate defendants and indeterminate plaintiffs.146 
Recognizing the relative novelty of this approach, the judge wrote:  
“We are in a different world of proof than that of the archetypical 
smoking gun. We must make the best estimates of probability that we 
can using the help of experts such as statisticians and our own 
common sense and experience with the real universe.”147 
The court’s analysis is instructive.  Judge Weinstein noted that it 
was quite possible that no particular plaintiff would be able to trace her 
injuries to a particular defendant, and that only statistics would show 
any harm at all.  He illustrated such a scenario: 
Let us assume that there are 10 manufacturers and a 
population of 10 million persons exposed to their product. 
Assume that among this population 1,000 cancers of a 
certain type could be expected, but that 1,100 exist, and 
 
145 In re Agent Orange Prods. Liab. Litig., 597 F. Supp. 740 (E.D.N.Y. 1984); 
see also Peter H. Schuck, Agent Orange on Trial (1986) (describing trial and 
resolution, including process of arriving at settlement). 
146 Id. at 840-43.  The court later wrote that causation could not be established 
to allow liability.  See In re “Agent Orange” Prod. Liab. Litig., 611 F. Supp. 1223, 
1229 (E.D.N.Y. 1985) (granting summary judgment to defendants against plaintiffs 
who had opted out of certified class, since plaintiffs could not show a “causal link 
between exposure to Agent Orange and the various diseases from which they are 
allegedly suffering”), aff’d, 818 F.2d 187 (2d Cir. 1987); In re “Agent Orange” Prod. 
Liab. Litig., 611 F. Supp. 1267 (E.D.N.Y. 1985) (also granting summary judgment 
against an opt-out plaintiff), aff’d, 818 F.2d 187 (2d Cir. 1987). 
147 Id. at 838; see also In re Joint Eastern & Southern Dist. Asbestos Litigation, 
52 F.3d 1124, 1131 (2d Cir. 1995) (“Causation in toxic torts normally comprises two 
separate inquiries: whether the epidemiological or other scientific evidence 
establishes a causal link between c (asbestos exposure) and d (colon cancer), and 
whether plaintiff is within the class of persons to which inferences from the general 
causation evidence should be applied.”); Rosenberg, supra note 41, at 859-60 
(advocating proportional liability for defendants “in proportion to the probability of 
causation of harm” to the plaintiff class members).  But cf. Wright, supra note 7, at 
1822-23 (arguing that mere statistics, even when based on causal generalizations, 
cannot adequately show legal causation). 
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that this increase is “statistically significant,” permitting a 
reasonable conclusion that 100 cancers are due to the 
product of the manufacturers.148 
In such a case, Weinstein recognized, “no plaintiff can show that his or 
her cancer was caused by any one of the defendants.”149 The Agent 
Orange case was a clear instance of the underdetermined causation that 
is so common in mass torts.  Similar concerns have dogged lawsuits 
seeking compensation for harm caused by products such as tobacco, 
asbestos, and DES.   
These concerns were also particularly acute in the DES 
litigation.150 DES was a drug which was used widely over a twenty-
four year period, until it was found to cause reproductive illness in 
children of pregnant women who took the drug.151 DES was 
manufactured by a variety of companies, and many different types of 
DES tablets, made by different manufacturers, were interchanged 
freely.152 They were fungible products.  Not only was it difficult to 
determine whether plaintiffs’ injury arose from DES; it was also 
difficult to trace the harm to any particular defendant.153 In most 
cases, claims were brought by daughters of women who ingested DES.  
In some cases, claims were brought by granddaughters of the women 
as well.154 Statistical evidence was employed throughout the DES 
litigation to show a likelihood of harm to plaintiffs, thus establishing 
causation.155 Statistical evidence has been used in a variety of other 
 
148 In re “Agent Orange” Litig., 597 F. Supp. 740, 837 (E.D.N.Y. 1984). 
149 Id.
150 See Russell, supra note 109, at 1080. 
151 See generally Robinson, supra note 30, at 713-17. 
152 Id. at 722-26. 
153 Id. 
154 See generally John B. Maynard, Note, Third-Generation-DES Claims, 27 
New Eng. L. Rev. 241, 285 (1992). 
155 Tracey I. Batt, Note, DES Third-Generation Liability: A Proximate Cause, 
18 Cardozo L. Rev. 1217, 1219-22 (1996); see also Brook, The Use of Statistical 
Evidence of Identification in Civil Litigation, 29 St. Louis U. L. J. 293, 327-28 
(1985). 
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mass restitution contexts.  These include litigation related to tobacco, 
asbestos, Benedictin, and other products.156 
Statistical causation in mass tort cases is generally shown by the 
use of epidemiological studies.157 These are used to “determine 
whether there is a statistical association between defendant’s product 
and plaintiff’s disease by comparing the incidence of disease in those 
exposed to defendant’s product with the disease’s background rate.”158 
156 As summarized by one scholar: 
One way the causal link was made in the tobacco cases was the 
introduction of statistical methods of proof.  Plaintiffs in the 
tobacco litigation were allowed to show that a widely distributed 
product increased the aggregate number of state residents who 
contracted a disease; such as lung cancer.  In fact, this method of 
proving causation seems to be widely accepted in cancer-related 
cases. . . . In toxic-tort cases involving exposure to the drug 
Bendectin, as well as silicone, herbicides, and asbestos, courts 
have allowed statistical evidence to demonstrate causation where 
direct proof of causation was lacking.  
See Angela Lipanovich, Smoke Before Oil, 35 Golden Gate U. L. Rev. 429 463-64 
(2005) (citations omitted). 
157 Epidemiology is the branch of medical science that employs integrated use 
of statistics to “to identify and establish the causes of human diseases.”  See 
generally Bert Black & David E. Lilienfeld, Epidemiologic Proof in Toxic Tort 
Litigation, 52 Fordham L. Rev. 732, 736 (1984).  As one writer notes: 
The hallmark of epidemiology is that it is based on the study of 
populations, not individuals.  It seeks to establish associations 
between alleged causes and effects by one of two methods: either 
comparing the incidence of disease across exposed and unexposed 
populations, or comparing the incidence of exposure across sick 
and healthy populations.  With proper scientific interpretation, 
these correlations lend great weight to an inference of causation. 
Gold, supra note 37, at 380. 
158 Berger, supra note 39, at 2125-26; see also Gold, supra note 39, at 384 
(discussing phenomena of increased risk and enhanced probability of harm). 
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V. Application to Attenuation in Reparations 
The same tools used in the mass tort context can be used to address 
legal attenuation concerns in reparations.  We will examine each type 
of attenuation here. 
 
A. Tort Claims 
1. Act Attenuation 
Overcoming act attenuation requires showing a link between the 
harm done to slaves and the harm to modern slave descendants.  As in 
the mass tort context, statistical analysis can be one very helpful tool 
in showing this link.  Other tort concepts like substantial factor can 
also play a role in showing a legal link between slavery and current 
harms.   
Slave descendants could show a link between harm to slaves and 
later harms suffered by slave descendants, through the use of statistical 
evidence on the economic effects of slave descent.159 The alleged 
harm to slave descendants is economic loss.  It should be possible to 
establish whether slave descendants as a group have a lower rate of 
economic prosperity than the general populace.  (In particular, it would 
probably be helpful, if statistically possible, to compare prosperity 
levels of slave descendants against those of control groups, such as the 
descendants of free Blacks.)  A study could show that slave 
descendants as a group currently enjoy some ascertainable level of 
prosperity.  Applying statistical tools, slave descendants could then 
seek to show whether, absent slavery, they would have attained a 
greater level of prosperity.  It should be possible to put a number on 
this difference.   
 
159 Cf. Twerski & Sebok, supra note 34, at 1404, 1409 (suggesting that novel 
cases particularly benefit from the use of statistical data). Of course, such a study 
may be complex and difficult to perform.  See Berger, supra note 39, at 2127-28 
(noting the difficulty of conducting epidemiological studies). 
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The existence of such a gap seems likely, given the well-known 
economic disparities between Blacks and members of other races.160 
Statistical evidence could serve to put a number on that gap.  Such 
application would probably involve, to adapt the language previously 
used by Judge Weinstein in the Agent Orange litigation, an 
examination along these lines: 
Let us assume . . . a population of 10 million persons 
exposed to [slave descent]. Assume that among this 
population 1,000 [persons below the poverty line] could be 
expected, but that 1,100 exist, and that this increase is 
“statistically significant,” permitting a reasonable 
conclusion that 100 [persons below the poverty line] are 
due to the [slave descent].161 
Similar analysis could be done for various degrees of prosperity, 
allowing reparations advocates to put a solid number on the question 
of just how slaves’ lost property and lost wages affect their 
descendants today.162 Adapting language from torts, slave descendants 
could thus show that that slavery was a substantial factor in 
determining their prosperity level, and that compensation is therefore 
appropriate. 
Reparations advocates can also point to existing cases to suggest 
that slavery is the type of harm where burden shifting may be an 
appropriate response to underdetermination.  The harms inflicted 
under slavery were intentional, not negligent, which is one indicator of 
potential liability.163 The harm, against slaves and their children, was 
also foreseeable, another potential indicator of liability.164 Negative 
effects on a victim’s children are a logical result of severe 
 
160 See supra note 48  (noting these statistics).   
161 In re “Agent Orange” Litig., 597 F. Supp. 740, 837 (E.D.N.Y. 1984). 
162 It is possible as well that statistics will weaken the case for reparations, for 
example, by showing that the harm to slave descendants is not as great as envisioned.   
163 Twerski & Sebok, supra note 34, at 1385-86. 
164 Id. (foreseeability of harm). 
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wrongdoing.165 The very act of slavery carries an “air of culpability” 
which some commentators suggest is another indicator of liability.166 
Other factors also weigh in favor of liability: Slaves were subjected to 
inhuman treatment,167 and an argument can be made that slavery was a 
valueless act.168 
2. Victim Attenuation 
Tort concepts also address victim attenuation concerns.  Loss of a 
chance doctrine provides a conceptual hook to show harm to plaintiffs.  
And statistical evidence could be used to demonstrate concrete harm to 
slave descendants, overcoming the standing hurdle and eventually the 
causation hurdle.   
The conceptual underpinning for overcoming victim attenuation is 
simple enough. It is certainly true, as the Slave Descendants court 
notes, that any number of eventualities could have deprived plaintiffs 
of receiving economic benefits from their ancestors.  The plaintiffs’ 
 
165 To the extent that slave owners knew that they were harming slaves’ 
children, note Posner and Vermeule, it may be unreasonable to view victim 
attenuation as an obstacle, because slave descendants were a knowable victim 
themselves of slave owner wrongdoing.  Posner & Vermeule, supra note 9, at 700.  
See also Rosenberg, supra note 41, at 884-85 (“But one could just as easily describe 
the defendant’s duty in aggregative terms as a duty extending from the defendant to a 
class — the exposed population. . . . The defendant’s wrongdoing inflicts loss on the 
exposed population as a whole.”).  
166 Id.; see also Wenger, supra note 1, at 202 n.34 (noting argument that slavery 
was a violation of natural law); Randy E. Barnett, Essay, Was Slavery 
Unconstitutional Before the Thirteenth Amendment?: Lysander Spooner’s Theory of 
Interpretation, 28 Pac. L.J. 977, 988-1014 (1997). 
167 See Malone, supra note 30, at 95 (noting that “inhuman treatment” was a 
factor in court finding causation). 
168 See id. at 86 (noting that courts are more likely to find causation if harmful 
act is not valuable to society); but cf. Wenger, supra note 1, at  238-40 (noting the 
economic value of slavery to the country).  
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ancestors may have chosen to spend their wealth on themselves169 or 
donate it to charity.  They may have chosen to give it to certain 
favored children, and plaintiffs’ particular lines of parentage might 
have been unrepresented.  Even if plaintiffs’ ancestors had fully 
intended to pass on their wealth, they may have been unable to do so.  
They may have needed assets to deal with daily expenses or 
emergencies, and had no money to pass on.  They may have been poor 
money managers, losing their assets in unwise investment.170 They 
may have been victims of the many financial uncertainties that the 
country has seen, losing money to market crashes, business 
competition, changing laws, wars, speculation, financial panics, 
currency fluctuation, and inflation.171 
Every one of these is a possibility.  And yet, it is also possible that 
these ancestors, had they been paid for their labor, would have passed 
down some amount of wealth, which would have eventually come to 
the plaintiffs.172 This is not an unrealistic scenario; many Americans 
 
169 This is a reasonable possibility.  There is no indication that plaintiffs intend 
to pass on parts of any recovery to their descendants, rather than simply consuming 
it.  See also Hylton, Slavery, supra note 16, at 39 (“Precariousness would have given 
the slave a strong incentive to spend his money on his own desires right away.”). 
170 See id. (“The problem that remains is the passage of time, which allows for 
many opportunities for money to be squandered or used in other ways.”). 
171 Sherwin, supra note 22, at 1445 (“The passage of time and the countless 
human acts and choices that have intervened lead to daunting problems in tracing 
injury to current generations of African Americans, and separating the harm of 
enslavement from the effects of more recent public and private acts.”). 
172 And, as with other tort cases, the supposed breaks in the causal chain of 
harm to slave descendants are not particularly debilitating.  In particular, the court is 
concerned that it cannot verify that slave ancestors would have given their assets to 
their descendants.  This concern is overstated, given that bequeathing assets to 
descendants is the normal course of events.  Hylton, Slavery, supra note 16, at 39 
(“In order to avoid reducing damages to descendants for a reason that was not only 
beyond the slave’s control but a foreseeable consequence of the initial injury, we 
should assume that if paid, he would have passed the money on at the same rate as 
parents in conventional families do.”).  But cf. Waldron, supra note 77, at 10 (noting 
“whimsical” nature of property disposition). 
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enjoy some measure of inherited wealth.173 It is unrealistic to suggest 
that none of the slave descendants would have received inherited 
wealth.  And therein lies the kicker – slave descendants can indeed 
show that they suffered a concrete harm, namely the loss of a chance.  
While they cannot show that they would ultimately have been the 
recipients of assets, this inability exists only because they never got the 
chance to receive assets in the first place.  The lost chance suffered by 
slave descendants is a real and concrete harm.  Showing the statistical 
likelihood of inheritance answers the recurring critique that the amount 
of compensation is not calculable.174 
Statistical evidence can be used to show just how great of a chance 
slave descendants lost.  Slave descendants will need to show the 
statistical likelihood of present claimants receiving wealth from slave 
ancestors, as well as the likely amount of any inheritance.  This 
number should be calculable.  Armed with such a number, slave 
descendants can assert to a judge that they are not merely showing a 
genealogical relationship; by depriving their ancestors of 
compensation, slave owners deprived the slaves’ descendants of a 
statistically measurable sum.175 Despite the possibility of intervening 
 
173 See generally Thomas M. Shapiro, The Hidden Cost of Being African-
American: How Wealth Perpetuates Inequality (2004) (discussing transfer of wealth 
between generations); Westley, supra note 48, at 440-45 (discussing economic 
disparities between Blacks and whites). 
174 See Richard Epstein, The Case Against Black Reparations, 84 B.U. L. Rev. 
1177, 1184 (2004) (“We have no idea of how much of that profit (assuming that it 
could be calibrated) actually descended to the next generation.  The ordinary 
business will reinvest some share of its profits, but will declare some as dividends 
and pay some out in salaries to its employees.  Any dividends and wages do not 
descend to the next generation.”); Massey, supra note 9, at 164-65 (“It is impossible 
to know how much better off today’s black Americans would be, if at all.  It is even 
more speculative to try pinning a number on the loss suffered by any given 
contemporary individual descendant of American slavery.”). 
175 This number may be smaller than commentators assume.  Indeed, economic 
studies suggest that, absent the presence of legal regimes to preserve wealth, it is 
difficult to keep fortunes together.  See generally John F. Hart, “A Less Proportion of 
Idle Proprieters”: Madison, Property Rights, and the Abolition of Fee Tail, 58 Wash. 
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causes, plaintiffs have some statistically measurable, non-negligible 
chance of being the recipients of their ancestors’ wealth.176 (And it is 
almost certain that reparations defendants could not establish that they 
were not the cause of plaintiffs’ injuries.)     
Even incomplete or preliminary statistical evidence should be 
enough to overcome the standing issue that proved fatal in Slave 
Descendants. The but-for connection between slavery and eventual 
harm to slave descendants is not in doubt; the only question is exactly 
how much worse slave descendants have fared compared to control 
groups.  A court could apply loss of a chance doctrine, taking judicial 
notice that but for slavery, slave descendants today would enjoy 
greater prosperity.  That admission, coupled with basic statistical 
evidence, could be used to show the level of harm required for 
standing.   
The standing analysis reflected in the current Slave Descendants 
opinion is questionable and should be reconsidered.177 The court’s 
standing analysis imposed on plaintiffs an unnecessarily high 
hurdle.178 Even reparations critics found the court’s standing analysis 
 
& Lee L. Rev. 167 (2001) (discussing the effect of fee tail and primogeniture in 
preserving wealth between generations).  Ironically, Blacks missed out on many of 
the devices, such as fee tail and primogeniture, designed to maintain wealth.  Thus, 
principles of corrective justice suggest that they should be given the benefit of every 
doubt on whether they would have kept wealth and passed it on to future generations. 
176 Of course, the question might be complicated by the potential need for a  
Daubert-approved statistical model in order to show standing.   
177 See Sebok, The Lawsuit, supra  note 65, at 1-2; Epstein, supra note 174, at 
1179-81; Eric J. Miller, Representing the Race: Standing to Sue in Reparations 
Lawsuits, 20 Harv. Blackletter L.J. 91, 93 (2004). 
178 In particular, the court may be requiring a showing of proximate cause, 
when all that is really required is a showing of but-for cause.  See Richard H. Fallon, 
Jr., Of Justiciability, Remedies, and Public Law Litigation: Notes on The 
Jurisprudence of Lyons, 59 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1, 17-18 (1984); Calabresi, supra note 7, 
at 71-73 (discussing the difference between “three conceptions of ‘cause’: ‘causal 
link,’ ‘but for cause,’ and ‘proximate cause’”); see also Aaron D. Twerski & Neil B. 
Cohen, Informed Decision Making and the Law of Torts: The Myth of Justiciable 
 
CAUSATION AND ATTENUATION 
54 
flawed; the court’s decision is “little more than a disguised ruling on 
the merits,” suggested one critic.179 The Slave Descendants court 
suggested that proximate causation must be fully established to show 
standing.  That idea, however, goes against the law and the literature in 
this area.180 
Causation, 1988 U. Ill. L. Rev. 607 (suggesting that courts generally insist on too 
high a burden of causation).   
Prior to Lujan, standing could sometimes be established under rather attenuated 
theories of causation.  “The [Supreme] Court has not . . . required a showing of strict 
tort causation in the sense that the complained of conduct be the but-for cause of the 
plaintiff’s harm. To the contrary, the Court has been willing to accept quite 
attenuated theories of causation, at least at the pleading stage.”  Karl S. Coplan, 
Refracting the Spectrum of Clean Water Act Standing in Light of Lujan v. Defenders 
of Wildlife, 22 Colum. J. Envtl. L. 169, 185 (1997). 
Lujan applied a less forgiving eye to the standing requirement.  However, 
Lujan did not alter the basic inquiry.  504 U.S. at 560-61.  In addition, Lujan sets 
forth a factual requirement to establish standing at the summary judgment stage, see 
Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561.  Lujan stated that “at the pleading stage, general factual 
allegations of injury resulting from the defendant’s conduct may suffice, for on a 
motion to dismiss we presume that general allegations embrace those specific facts 
that are necessary to support the claim.”  Id. 
179 Epstein, supra note 174, at 1179-81.  Courts are often accused of using 
standing to dodge serious issues. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, What’s Standing After 
Lujan? Of Citizen Suits, “Injuries,” and Article III, 91 Mich. L. Rev. 163, 166 
(1992); John A. Ferejohn & Larry D. Kramer, Independent Judges, Dependent 
Judiciary: Institutionalizing Judicial Restraint, 77 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 962, 1009 (2002); 
Edward A. Hartnett, The Standing of the United States: How Criminal Prosecutions 
Show that Standing Doctrine is Looking for Answers in All the Wrong Places, 97 
Mich. L. Rev. 2239, 2251-52 & n.63 (1999).   
180 Standing requires showing three elements:  injury in fact, causal connection 
to a defendant, and redressability.  504 U.S. at 560-61.  This is a lesser burden than 
causation.  As Richard Fallon argues, “the causation requirement of personal interest 
standing is not that of proximate cause. It seems instead to replicate the tort law 
concept of ‘cause in fact’ or ‘but for’ causation.”  Fallon, supra note 178, at 17; see 
also Epstein, supra note 174. 
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Of course, more detailed causal connection would ultimately be 
needed to establish liability.181 This would likely depend on a showing 
that slave descendants are statistically less prosperous than appropriate 
control groups.  In any event, statistical tools would be invaluable in 
showing causation, both the basic causation level required to show 
standing, and the more rigorous showing that would be needed to 
establish liability.  Other tort doctrines will also be useful at the 
liability stage.  For example, it might make sense for a court to use a 
substantial factor test to determine liability.  Statistics would probably 
play a major role in that inquiry as well, to show whether slave descent 
is indeed a substantial factor in determining the prosperity of slave 
descendants.   
 
3. Wrongdoer Attenuation 
Finally, the framework for apportioning liability set out in Sindell 
and other DES cases may provide a means of overcoming wrongdoer 
attenuation.  In Sindell, the court found that DES manufacturers could 
be held liable despite the inability of plaintiffs to connect directly the 
manufacturers to the plaintiffs’ harm.  That court noted, “as between 
an innocent plaintiff and negligent defendants, the latter should bear 
the cost of injury.”182 Similar reasoning applies in reparations:  Where 
the choice is between letting harm lie with descendants of innocent 
slaves, or with the corporate entities who participated in slavery, it 
makes sense to favor slave descendants.  Sindell apportioned liability 
according to the market share of each defendant.183 That framework, 
 
181 See Fallon, supra note 178, at 17-18 (discussing difference between 
causation and standing requirements); Mark S. Brodin, The Standard of Causation in 
the Mixed-Motive Title VII Action: A Social Policy Perspective, 82 Colum. L. Rev. 
292, 307 n.70 (1982) (noting this difference); Epstein, supra note 174, at 1181 
(same). 
182 26 Cal.3d at 610-11. 
183 The Sindell court used proportional liability, allocating liability between the 
defendants in proportion to their market share. Id. at 612-13. 
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if adopted in the reparations context, could potentially resolve many 
thorny distributional questions. 
There are, however, significant conceptual hurdles that could 
impede application of Sindell to reparations.  In Sindell, the major 
players in the DES market – who collectively comprised a large 
majority of the relevant market actors – were all joined in the 
litigation.184 Because of this, the Sindell apportionment scheme 
seemed fair in a broad sense – most of the market was represented by 
the defendants joined in the case, and the only question was how to 
divide liability between apparently liable parties.   
In contrast, market share liability in the reparations context is less 
compelling, precisely because it is not possible to join individual 
defendants representing even a majority of the slavery market.  Certain 
long-lived individual corporate slave market participants still exist, 
and are defendants in reparations litigation.  It is all but certain, 
however, that the majority of the private actor participants in the slave 
markets is no longer in existence, or cannot be matched with any 
current defendant.  Existing reparations defendants represent only a 
small percent of the original slavery market.  The market coverage of 
joined defendants in the reparations litigation thus differs drastically 
from the market coverage present in Sindell. Because of that 
difference, direct application of a Sindell framework is not possible 
without some kind of modification.   
Various possibilities exist for adapting Sindell to the slavery 
market.  One possibility would be to join government actors as 
additional defendants.  This route has the benefit of seeming to create 
a somewhat Sindell-like level of market coverage.  Combined with 
corporate defendants, government actors could be viewed as 
comprising much of the slave market.  However, any attempt to join 
government actors runs into a host of problems, starting with 
 
184 Id. at 611-12 (noting that joined defendants comprised 90 percent of the 
DES market).   
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sovereign immunity.185 In addition, it is not clear that joining 
government actors would actually result in a Sindell-like level of 
market coverage among the universe of joined defendants.  
Government and corporate entities played different and often 
overlapping roles in the slave market.  It is not clear that adding 
government actors would alter the market coverage of joined 
defendants and make Sindell application any easier. 
Another possibility would be to hold currently joined reparations 
defendants liable for the acts of other participants in the market for 
slavery, who have not been joined in the litigation.  This approach is 
similar to “enterprise liability” theories which hold that any actors in 
an enterprise can be found liable for harms it causes.186 Under such a 
system, individual corporate actors could be held liable not only for 
their own share of the original market, but also for the market share of 
the many other actors no longer in existence.  This would result in 
much greater potential monetary recovery for plaintiffs, since no 
portion of the original market would be written off as judgment proof.  
However, by imputing to existing defendants the shares of judgment 
proof former market participants, such a framework raises potentially 
insuperable questions of fairness.   
Finally, Sindell could be adapted in a more limited fashion to allow 
for pro rata recovery according to the market share of existing 
defendants.  Under such a system, each defendant would be liable for 
its own portion of the original market for slavery, as defendants in 
Sindell were liable for their portions of the DES market.  However, 
those portions of the initial market not represented by current 
defendants – almost certainly the vast majority of the market for 
slavery – would simply be written off as uncollectible.  Thus if slave 
descendants can join defendants representing 10% of the slave market, 
 
185 See generally Wenger, supra note 1, at 243-49 (discussing government 
defenses against reparations claims). 
186 See Hall v. E. I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co., Inc., 345 F. Supp. 353 
(E.D.N.Y. 1972); Weinstein, supra note 41, at 149-52 (discussing enterprise 
liability). 
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then they can collect damages representing 10% of the economic harm 
suffered by slave descendants.  The remaining 90% would be 
attributable to non-collectable (perhaps non-existent) entities.  This 
approach would provide a lower level of potential monetary recovery 
to slave descendants, since the majority of claims would be written off 
as uncollectible.  (Those would be the claims attributed to participants 
in the original market, who are not joined to the current litigation).  
However, because this modification would not force any defendant to 
pay for harm greater than its percent of market share, it is the least 
problematic route from a fairness standpoint.   
 
B. Unjust Enrichment 
Although the foregoing analysis is addressed to torts, much of it 
would apply to unjust enrichment claims as well.  For example, unjust 
enrichment claimants could use statistical evidence to attack victim 
attenuation arguments.  And Sindell-like market share restitution 
would be a way of avoiding wrongdoer attenuation in unjust 
enrichment cases, as well as in tort cases.   
The possibility of apportioning liability according to market shares 
is particularly attractive in the unjust enrichment context.  Some 
scholars believe that unjust enrichment claims are the best opportunity 
for reparations.187 Unjust enrichment offers significant advantages, 
including its lower threshold of proof (more likely than not).188 As 
others have noted, however, unjust enrichment claims run into 
difficulty at the remedy stage.189 The question of how to apportion 
blame is not at all clear.  Thus, while unjust enrichment can answer 
some of the problems inherent in tort claims, they do not provide a 
clear avenue for remedy.   
Sindell market-share apportionment may be the best way to 
convert unjust enrichment claims from academic fantasy into legal 
 
187 See, e.g., Sebok, Prosaic Justice, supra note 22, at 52. 
188 Sherwin, supra note 22, at 1447-53. 
189 Sebok, Two Concepts, supra note 15, at 1431-40.   
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reality.  If market share liability provides a solution to the tracing 
problem, unjust enrichment claims may become more viable.  Like the 
DES case addressed in Sindell, unjust enrichment claims run into the 
problem of tracing.  But also like Sindell, the harm alleged is largely 
fungible.  Thus, market share liability in unjust enrichment is 
appropriate.  This solution is attractive because it is easy to implement.  
It skips thorny theory questions at the implementation stage, offering a 
viable method to calculate each defendant’s contribution.   
Finally, unjust enrichment claims might also benefit from 
statistical analysis.  Victim and act attenuation problems in unjust 
enrichment, like in tort, can be addressed through the use of statistical 
evidence.   
 
C. Recap 
This Part has examined the idea of causation.  It is apparent that 
legal attenuation critiques, including the Slave Descendants court’s 
analysis, are oversimplified.  The question of causation in reparations 
requires analysis of underdetermined causation, which does not always 
preclude liability.  Reparations advocates should use the tools of mass 
tort, particularly statistical causation, to establish liability.   Statistical 
tools may be used to show harm to modern claimants, resolving legal 
concerns of victim and act attenuation and addressing standing 
concerns.  And conceptual tools used in the DES and other cases, 
including modified Sindell-style market share liability, can be used to 
address wrongdoer attenuation. 
 
VI. Conclusion  
Much remains to be done.  Reparations advocates must test 
statistical causation arguments to see if they satisfy courts’ lack of 
harm and standing concerns.  The argument should be further 
developed and refined for use in showing causation at trial, ultimately 
addressing act attenuation concerns that arise at that stage.   And the 
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Sindell harm contribution analysis should be employed as needed to 
address wrongdoer attenuation.   
Future steps might include tying these causal tools to particular 
proposals for asset distribution.  It is nearly impossible to discuss 
reparations today without at least a nod to the many distribution 
critiques raised by critics.190 Questions of direct or group 
compensation – themselves beyond the scope of this Article -- will 
eventually need to be answered.  However, these may also eventually 
turn out to be questions best answered by examining the mass tort 
experience, with its models for distribution to victims.191 
Despite the work that remains to be done, this Article shows that 
theoretical tools from the mass tort context may be helpful in 
addressing attenuation in the reparations debate.  Indeed, it turns out 
that attenuation, like many other concerns about reparations, may 
provide “grist for the mill of reparations critics, but [is] familiar in law, 
and the law has developed methods for dealing with (or ignoring) 
[it].”192 
190 See generally Wenger, supra note 1, at 253-56 (noting different proposals 
for distribution of reparations); Kyle D. Logue, Reparations as Redistribution, 84 
B.U. L. Rev. 1319, 1354-70 (discussing different models of distribution). 
191 See Weinstein, supra note 41, at 155-62. 
192 See Posner & Vermeule, supra note 9, at 702 (making this statement about 
potential problems in determining compensation amounts and in making any 
distribution of restitution). 
